Archives for posts with tag: Ships

After a long cycle of build-up in capacity in the 2000s, shipyards hit a new peak in global output in 2010. Since then, the impact of reduced vessel ordering on shipbuilders worldwide has been a key issue for the industry, and it’s clear that global output has dropped significantly and shipyard capacity has diminished. But how far can those shipyards still active look ahead today?

Looking Forward

‘Forward cover’ is one basic indicator of the volume of work that shipyards have on order, calculated by dividing the total orderbook by the last year’s output (in CGT). Unsurprisingly, after a period of extremely low ordering in 2016, forward cover has shortened. Currently, global forward cover stands at 2.3 years having declined throughout 2016, as the orderbook shrank by 25% in CGT terms. Global forward cover was as low as 2.1 years at the start of 2013 (but delivery volumes in 2012 were 37% higher than in 2016) and peaked at 5.6 years in 2008.

Looking around the shipbuilding world, yards in Korea currently have the lowest level of cover at 1.5 years. European yards, meanwhile, bucked the trend in 2016, increasing their forward cover on the back of cruise ship orders (and falling production volumes) to 4.2 years.

Less To Go Round

Fewer fresh orders have also led to a greater number of yards ending the year without receiving a single contract. During 2005-08, the number of yards to take at least one order was on average equivalent to 87% of the number of yards active (with at least one unit on order) at the start of the year. In 2009-15, with ordering generally lower, the figure averaged 49%. In 2016 this fell further to 28%, with just 133 yards receiving an order. In China, 48 yards (26 of which were state-backed) won an order in 2016 compared to 284 yards in 2007. In Japan, 22 yards took an order in 2016 compared to 60 as recently as 2015. In Korea, 11 shipyards took an order last year.

Out Of Work?

Whilst many yards have tried to cope with the lower demand environment by slowing production or working outside their traditional product range, the statistics clearly point to huge challenges. In 2016, 117 yards delivered the final unit on their orderbook. The peak production level of these yards, many of them smaller builders, totals around 4m CGT. However, 163 yards are scheduled to deliver their current orderbook by the end of 2017 (although in reality slippage may mean some of the work runs on past the end of the year). Statistically, this represents 43% of the number of yards active at the start of the year. Although these yards have been reining back capacity and outputting less in recent years, the peak production level of this set of yards totals as much as 12m CGT. Offshore builders of course face huge pressures too, with about half of those active scheduled to deliver their final unit on order this year.

Global shipyard output and capacity have fallen significantly since the peak years. However, many remaining yards still don’t need to look too far ahead to see the end of their current workload. The shipbuilding industry will be hoping to see a return to a more active newbuilding market sooner rather than later.


There have been plenty of record breaking facts and figures to report across 2016, unfortunately mostly of a gloomy nature! From a record low for the Baltic Dry Index in February to a post-1990 low for the ClarkSea Index in August, there have certainly been plenty of challenges. That hasn’t stopped investors however (S&P not newbuilds) so let’s hope for less record breakers (except demolition!?) in 2017.SIW1254

Unwelcome Records….

Our first record to report came in August when the ClarkSea Index hit a post-1990 low of $7,073/day. Its average for the year was $9,441/day, down 35% y-o-y and also beating the previous cyclical lows in 2010 and 1999. With OPEX for the same basket of ships at $6,394/day, margins were thin or non-existent.

Challenges Abound….

Across sectors, average tanker earnings for the year were “OK” but still wound down by 40%, albeit from an excellent 2015. Despite a good start and end to the year, the wet markets were hit hard by a weak summer when production outages impacted. The early part of the year also brought us another unwelcome milestone: the Baltic Dry Index falling to an all time low of 291. Heavy demolition in the first half and better than expected Chinese trade helped later in the year – fundamentals may be starting to turn but perhaps taking time to play out with bumps on the way. The container market (see next week) had another tough year, including its first major corporate casualty for 30 years in Hanjin. LPG had a “hard” landing after a stellar 2015, LNG showed small improvements and specialised products started to ease back. As reported in our mid-year review, every “dog has its day” and in 2016, this was Ro-Ro and Ferry, with earnings 50% above the trend since 2009. Also spare a thought for the offshore sector, arguably facing an even more extreme scenario than shipping.

Buy, Buy, Buy….

In our review of 2015, we speculated that buyers might be “eyeing up a bottoming out dry cycle” in 2016 and a 24% increase in bulker tonnage bought and sold suggests a lot of owners agreed. Indeed, 44m dwt represents another all time record for bulker S&P, with prices increasing marginally after the first quarter and brokers regularly reporting numerous parties willing to inspect vessels coming for sale. Tanker investors were much more circumspect and volumes and prices both fell by a third. Greeks again topped the buyer charts, followed by the Chinese. Demo eased in 2H but (incl. containers) total volumes were up 14% (44m dwt).

Order Drought….

Depending on your perspective, an overall 71% drop in ordering (total orders also hit a 35 year record low) is either cause for optimism or for further gloom! In fact, only 113 yards took orders (for vessels 1,000+ GT) in the year, compared to 345 in 2013, with tanker orders down 83% and bulkers down 46%. There was little ordering in any sector, except Cruise (a record 2.5m GT and $15.6bn), Ferry and Ro-Ro (all niche business however and of little help to volume yards).

Final Record….

Finally a couple more records – global fleet growth of 3% to 1.8bn dwt (up 50% since the financial crisis with tankers at 555m dwt and bulkers at 794m dwt) and trade growth of 2.6% to 11.1bn tonnes (up 3bn tonnes since the financial crisis) mean we still finish with the largest fleet and trade volumes of all time! Plenty of challenges again in 2017 but let’s hope we aren’t reporting as many gloomy records next year.
Have a nice New Year!

Today’s Shipping Intelligence Weekly comes on the 896th anniversary of what was, back then, one of the most catastrophic losses to hit shipping for many years. On November 25th 1120, the sinking of the so-called White Ship off the French port of Barfleur killed the heir to the English throne and prompted a civil war between the forces of Matilda and Stephen. Fortunately, ships are safer today!

White Ship On The White List?

According to the historical record, the White Ship had been “recently-refitted”, although it seems unlikely that standards in the yards would have been on a par with the present system of special surveys. Today, the industry has an interlocking network of regulatory bodies dedicated to preventing casualties and losses. These include flag states, class societies, port state control bodies and others.

The loss of Prince William Adelin’s White Ship was blamed at the time on “excessive drunkenness and overcrowding” amongst the crew: not something that would be tolerated by today’s port authorities. Back to the 21st century, the Graph of the Week shows the number of total losses recorded by Clarksons Research by ship type. Over the long term, the trend is downward: 153 losses were registered in 1996, but only 51 have been recorded so far for 2015 (ships 100+ GT).

It is possible that a more systematic approach to safety and environmental monitoring has helped to ensure that only well-maintained ships put to sea. In 1996, the MoUs collectively performed just over 30,000 inspections, 9.6% of which resulted in a detention. By 2015, the number of inspections had risen to more than 80,000. But detention levels have consistently declined, to 3.5% of vessels inspected in 2015. The most likely explanation for this is that fewer vessels with deficiencies serious enough to warrant detention are being encountered.

The reduced trend in losses has been particularly marked since 2009, driven by fewer losses of small general cargo vessels. 1,817 general cargo vessels have been scrapped since the start of 2009. This has removed elderly breakbulk tonnage (which hung on in the boom) from the market, possibly reducing losses.

A Big Loss

Of course, although losses have become less frequent in numerical terms, a persistent fear for the industry is a high profile casualty (as the White Ship was). Analogous modern-day examples might include the Costa Concordia ($1.2bn salvage cost) or Rena ($0.7bn). The ability of salvage operators, hull & machinery insurers or P&I clubs to handle a larger loss of an ultra-large containership or cruise ship has been much debated.

Accidents Happen…

The grounding of the rig Transocean Winner off Scotland in August shows that even in the modern maritime world of the 21st century, vessels still get into difficulties. Fortunately, this was not a disaster: minimal oil was spilled, and the drilling unit was speedily salvaged. The indicators on the graph suggest that the industry may be becoming safer. In numerical terms, only 0.05% of the world fleet 100+ GT was lost in 2015, down from 0.26% back in 1996. These are positive signs, but, as much of the English government discovered aboard the White Ship, the sea always needs treating with respect. Have a nice day.


This week, the Bank of England put into place its action plan following the UK referendum on 23rd June, which indicated the British population’s preference to leave the European Union. While the political dust has yet to settle, shipping market observers have had time to form their views on the impact of ‘c’ on the industry. This week’s Analysis attempts to put the UK and the EU’s role in shipping in context.

Holding On

Once upon a time, of course, Britannia ‘ruled the waves’ and Great Britain, with its colossal maritime heritage (remember the British Empire?) was one of the world’s leading lights in ship ownership and shipbuilding. Today the story is a little different. UK owners account for just 2% of the global fleet in GT terms. The EU as a whole, however, remains a significant player, with 36% of world tonnage. While market share has shifted to the Asia-Pacific (39%), EU owners have held their own, led by the world’s largest owner nation in Greece, which has not been subject to its own ‘Grexit’ just yet.

Sailed East

Historically, Europeans were leading shipbuilders too, but in the modern era shipbuilding is dominated by Asia. In 2015, EU builders took 1.9m CGT of new orders (over 1,000 GT), 5% of the global total, and today account for 8% of the orderbook in CGT, whilst China, Korea and Japan together account for 84%. Europeans are now largely builders in the niche markets, dominating the cruise sector and maintaining a focus on small ships. Within the EU, the UK’s contribution is limited, with just two merchant vessels over 1,000 GT built since 2011.

Big Bloc

In terms of trade, the UK, given its status as the world’s 5th largest economy, accounts for a significant volume of imports and exports. However, in a global context these account for a relatively modest share. The UK’s imports account for an estimated 2% of global seaborne trade and its exports 1%. The EU, meanwhile, is much more significant, as befits its role as the world’s largest trading bloc, accounting for an estimated 16% of seaborne imports and 12% of exports.

Service Culture

One area where the UK and Europe maintain importance is as service providers. The UK is the world’s 14th largest flag and EU flags account for 18% of world tonnage. Lloyd’s Register in the UK is still a leading class society and along with DNV-GL and BV, the EU’s heavy-hitters, class 44% of the world fleet. Furthermore, London still remains one of the world’s pre-eminent maritime business hubs at the forefront of legal services, insurance and shipbroking too!

Wider, Still & Wider

However ‘Brexit’ plays out, it won’t go without notice. In fleet ownership or trade terms, the UK alone is not so significant (though the EU as a whole is). Perhaps the more important impact might be the wider fallout of uncertainty (or worse) surrounding one of the world’s largest economies. Meanwhile, the UK will be hoping that London can retain its role at the centre of commercial maritime affairs. Leaver or Remainer, have a nice day.

SIW1233 Graph of the Week

With seaborne transportation accounting for the vast majority of the world’s international trade, the importance of the shipping industry to the mechanics of the world economy is generally fairly evident. But putting it into context in actual annual value terms, how does the magnitude of the shipping business compare to the size of some of the world’s economies?

Big Traders

There are a number of ways to attempt to put the annual impact of the shipping industry into the context of the wider world economy. One is to examine the value of seaborne trades. Seaborne iron ore trade totalled 1.3bn tonnes in 2015. At an annual average ore price of around $50/t, that equates to a value of $68bn. That’s about the size of the GDP of Kenya. However, that’s dwarfed by seaborne crude oil trade. At 37.4m bpd last year, at an average oil price of around $52/bbl, that’s an annual value of $717bn, almost equivalent to the GDP of Turkey (the world’s 18th largest economy). On the container side, taking port handling as an interesting metric, last year there were an estimated 664m TEU lifts at the world’s box ports. Average handling charges vary significantly, but if they worked out at $150/TEU that’s an economy of just under $100bn, almost the size of the GDP of Angola.

Of course the value of global seaborne trade must be huge. The WTO estimates the value of all global trade at $16.5 trillion, and almost 85% by volume moves by sea. Seaborne trade is probably a little skewed to relatively cheaper goods but even allowing for, say, 50% of the total value, that’s still over $8 trillion, heading towards the size of China’s economy!

Adding The Value

Another way to put shipping’s magnitude into context is to take a look at the value of the assets. Between 2007 and 2015 the average annual level of investment in newbuildings was $127bn. That’s bigger than the GDP of Hungary. Alternatively, taking the value of the fleet today, $904bn, and allowing for, say, another 15 years of trading (the average age by tonnage is around 10 years), would equate to a per annum value of $60bn, still bigger than the economy of Panama.

Call In The Revenue

But perhaps the clearest way to mirror GDP is to check the annual earnings of the vessels, just as GDP measures economic production. In 2016’s challenging market conditions, the ClarkSea Index has averaged $9,733/day (which would total aggregate earnings of $77bn in a full year across the c.22,000 vessels in the main volume sectors), but back in 2007 it averaged over $33,060/day (across over 15,600 vessels). Across a year that’s earnings of $189bn. Almost as big as the economy of shipping’s favourite investor nation, Greece!

A Big Whole

Shipping is just one of a wide range of economic activities on the planet. Sometimes its impact can be hard to put into context. But in terms of ‘economic magnitude’, elements of the shipping industry can be as big as the whole of one of the world’s larger economies, especially in a good year. Have a nice day!

SIW1231 Graph of the Week

On 26th June 2016, a landmark development for the shipping industry will occur with the opening of the new third set of locks at the Panama Canal. Around ten years in the making, the expansion will enable significantly larger ships to transit the Canal, which is likely to have a wide and significant range of implications across a number of shipping sectors.

Beam Me Through, Scotty!

Since opening in 1914, the Panama Canal has provided a key point of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Nearly 14,000 transits of the canal were recorded last fiscal year, carrying around 230mt of cargo. While this accounts for just 2% of total global seaborne trade, the canal is a key shipping lane for a number of vessel segments and cargo flows.

At a macro level, vessel upsizing trends over recent decades have significantly increased the number of ships that are too large to transit the canal. On the 20th June 2016, more than half (55%) of total dwt capacity in the world fleet was accounted for by ships too large to transit the canal. The new, larger locks will enable many additional vessels to transit, as the maximum permissible beam will initially be raised to 49m, up from 32.3m at the old locks, while the maximum LOA and draft at the new locks will be 366m and 15.2m respectively. On the basis of the ‘New Panamax’ dimensions, 79% of dwt tonnage in the world fleet will now be able to officially pass through the canal.

Walk On The Wide Side

The most significant impact of the opening of the new locks will be on the containership sector, which has accounted for around a third of all canal transits and half of the annual toll revenue. More than 1,400 boxships of 12.5m teu (63% of total containership fleet capacity) are too large to transit the old locks today, but only around 200 of 3.0m teu (15% of fleet capacity) will be too large to pass through the new locks. Vessels of up to and around 13,500 TEU will be able to transit, compared to around 4-5,000 teu previously. This is expected to drive significant changes in containership deployment, particularly on the Transpacific trade.

Let’s Go Wide

In addition, the opening of the new locks is generally thought likely to have an important impact on the LNG, LPG and car carrier sectors. All VLGCs will be able to transit the new locks, as will the majority of LNG carriers, compared to only a handful of small LNG carriers previously. This is expected to lead to an increase in LNG vessels transiting the canal, typically with exports from the US.

Locked In To A New Era

Clarksons Research is marking this important milestone through a number of data updates. Fleet databases now include vessel indicators for the ability to transit both the “New” and “Old” locks of the Panama Canal, which will be displayed on vessel profiles within Shipping Intelligence Network and World Fleet Register. Vessel segmentation within the containership sector will also be updated to best reflect the structure of the fleet in the context of the expanded canal. As the Panama Canal enters a new era, for many in the shipping industry it’s the perfect time to “go wide”. Have a nice day!


Along with cyclicality (see SIW 1219), the other characteristic of the shipping markets which receives frequent mention is volatility. This is so evident that the shipping markets are often reported to be many times more volatile than the stock markets or other fluctuating economic variables. Here we take a look at some metrics which shine some light on the relative volatility of the industry.

Measuring The Waves

Many metrics can be used to measure aspects of volatility (though none are perfect). A few are calculated here to compare volatility in the shipping markets with that in the stock and commodity markets. One classic measure of volatility is the ‘coefficient of variation’ which takes the standard deviation of a series over time (a measure of the degree of dispersion of observations in a series) and divides it by the mean (average) level of the series.

Volatile Business

This metric highlights the degree of volatility present in the shipping markets (see graph). For the ClarkSea Index it stands at 50%, for VLCC spot earnings 73% and Capesize spot earnings 104%. For the FTSE-100 the figure stands at 29% and for the S&P 500 43%. The stock markets, often thought highly capricious, appear to be quite a bit less volatile than shipping on this basis (and given that stock markets generally track a trend rather than a cycle, one might have expected their coefficients to be biased upwards). The oil price compares more closely to shipping; the figure for Brent crude stands at 73%. Another useful metric is the average absolute monthly change as a percentage of the mean. For the ClarkSea Index this stands at 8%, for VLCC spot earnings at 26% and Capesize spot earnings 18%. For the FTSE-100 and S&P 500 this stands at around 3% and for Brent at around 6%, so again much lower.

Of course this analysis doesn’t capture everything. It excludes week-to-week (or day-to-day) volatility, though one might suppose that this could further emphasise shipping’s volatility (for example, see VLCC spot earnings on page 2). Equally it does not handle (or ‘de-trend’) indicators differently to account for the fact that stock markets typically follow a long-term trend, rather than a cycle like shipping.

Variation On A Theme?

But, even using a regression approach to ascertain variation from simple trend levels, over 60% of the FTSE-100 movement is explained by the trend. In shipping, much more of the variation appears to remain ‘unexplained’ (less than 10% of the variation of the ClarkSea Index would be accounted for by a simple trend).

Need Good Sea Legs?

So, volatility in shipping easily holds its own against fluctuations in other economic phenomena. It’s a competitive business, and rapid changes in pricing can be driven by the steepness of the supply curve at the margins, as well as a range of quite unpredictable factors. This helps make shipping interesting for asset players and short-term speculators but tricky for investors looking for certainty of return and analysts looking for a clear picture. Like seafarers themselves, shipping market players can quite rightly point to having the stomach for ups and downs as much as anyone. Have a nice day.