Archives for posts with tag: Price

For the golfers contesting this week’s Ryder Cup, the impact of bunkers can be minimised through skill, practice and a little luck. For shipowners, bunkers are unavoidable, and over the past few years high oil prices have ensured that they have been a major handicap. Shipowners are getting plenty of practice at dealing with high oil and bunker prices, maybe they are due a change in their “luck”?

When an onlooker suggested he may have been lucky holing three bunker shots in a row, golf legend Gary Player famously replied “the more I practice, the luckier I get”. Well, over the past few years a combination of low rates and high fuel costs have given shipowners plenty of “bunker practice”.

Par For The Course

The Graph of the Week tracks the share of freight revenue accounted for by bunker costs. In the early part of the period shown, the low and relatively stable oil price ensured that bunkers did not become too much of a burden, with peaks and troughs corresponding to the strength of the freight markets. Then in 2007-08 oil prices started to rise steeply, but the strength of the freight market helped to cover the impact of rising bunker costs and ensure that the share of bunker costs remained below 50%.

In The Rough

However, in the wake of the global financial crisis, a combination of high oil prices and weaker markets caused the share of freight revenues accounted for by bunker costs to climb to much higher levels. This peaked in late 2012 and early 2013, when bunker costs exceeded 80% of freight revenue on the example tanker voyage, with the extra costs of low sulphur fuels generating even higher shares on some routes.

Driving Down Costs

Well-practiced shipowners responded by finding ways to reduce fuel consumption: slow-steaming, retro-fitting fuel-saving equipment and ordering “eco-designs”. They have found environmental regulations pulling in the same direction, and in a way helping. After all, the risk of ordering a slower but more efficient ship is greatly reduced if everyone has to do so to meet regulatory targets.

Out Of The Woods?

Further help has come from the 15% fall in oil prices since June resulting in a reduction in bunker costs (Rotterdam 380cst currently stands at $540/t, down from $601/t in June). Oil prices are on track for their third straight monthly fall, with a combination of sluggish demand and ample supplies seeing the benchmark Brent crude spot price drop below $96/bbl this week, the lowest level for two years.

Bunkers’ share of freight remains volatile and dependent on market fluctuations. Recently the percentage has started to fluctuate in a slightly lower range than previously as lower bunker prices have helped to reduce the fuel cost burden. However, bunkers’ share of revenue is still uncomfortably high for many, and shipowners have had to learn to deal with high bunker costs. For those currently in a position to benefit from lower prices today, is it luck, or is it practice?


In the well-loved sitcom Absolutely Fabulous, Jennifer Saunders, Joanna Lumley and company provide an apt demonstration that even totally dysfunctional families can muddle through pretty well in the end, and have fun doing it. Could these comedy characters be a possible role model for regulating the shipping family?

Step Change For Regulators

As shipowners struggle with a long recession, escalating fuel costs and tricky credit, it’s easy to see why changing regulations seem like yet another chaotic burden in an already dysfunctional world. And, to be fair, the regulatory framework has made life harder in the last decade. Regulation of emissions, carbon footprint and ballast water have propelled regulators into the heart of shipping economics, leaving many owners struggling with hard choices about how to meet the new rules.

A Real Little Scrubber

Sulphur emissions illustrate how tricky things have become. Ideally regulations have a well-defined timescale and global adoption, but the sulphur regulations have neither. Although the timetable cuts the 3.5% global sulphur cap for marine fuel to 0.5% in 2020, the implementation date could be 2025 if the IMO’s distillate fuel study indicates supplies may not be available. And the global cap is not global either. The “Emission Control Areas” (ECAs) in North America, the Baltic and the North Sea have different rules. From next January ships trading in ECAs face a 0.1% sulphur cap.

Unquantifiable Options

More complexity is added by the options for getting down to 0.1%. One is to use eye-wateringly expensive distillate fuel; another is LNG; and the third is to install a “scrubber”. Since distillate fuel costs about 50% more than MFO, that’s unattractive, but LNG is unlikely to be much cheaper and scrubbers can cost in the region of $2-4m each.

Undecided Or Indecisive?

Luckily, the immediate decision is not too difficult because most ships will not spend long in ECAs. For example, a ship trading between Rotterdam and New York sails about 3,400 miles on the high seas, and around 20% of the distance is in ECAs. However, with more diverse trading the average over the year should be less, say 10%? From January 2015 a bulker sailing 300 days a year at sea, with 10% in ECAs, would spend an extra $0.2m a year on distillate fuel. Is it worth fitting a scrubber to save $0.2m pa? For bulkers no, but for ferries, offshore units and the like trading full time in ECAs, it might be. But when the global sulphur cap drops to 0.5% in 2020 the annual fuel bill will jump by over $2m, which would pay for a scrubber in a year or two, so that’s when the big step change in scrubber installation will happen. Unless, of course, the IMO defers to 2025.

Fabulous Future, Darling

So there you have it. Fuzzy regulations, but for most the economics are not too tricky. Intra-ECA ships should scrub up soon, global traders “wait-and-see”, and Transatlantic traders follow the ‘Ab Fab’ strategy – mix up a distillate cocktail and have a bit of fun! Have a nice day.


While the expanding role of Asia (especially China, see SIW 1132) in seaborne trade has grabbed headlines in recent years, developments in the US, still the world’s largest economy, have also had a significant impact. In a short space of time, changes in the US energy sector have dramatically altered global trading patterns in a number of commodities, significantly impacting the pattern of volume growth.

Putting On A Spurt Of Energy

For much of the last three decades, US oil production has been in decline, falling on average by 1% a year since 1980 to a low of 6.8m bpd in 2008. Yet technological advances have since led to huge gains in exploitation of ‘unconventional’ oil and gas shale reserves. In the space of just six years, the US managed to raise oil output alone by an astonishing 60% to almost 11m bpd, a new record.

Making An Oil Change

This has led to huge changes in US energy usage and import requirements. Crude oil imports have almost halved since 2005, and since 2010 have fallen on average by 11% p.a. to 260mt last year. Exports of crude oil from West Africa in particular have had to find a home elsewhere (unsurprisingly, many shipments now go East). Since US crude exports are still banned, US refiners have taken advantage of greater domestic crude supply to produce high volumes of oil products, especially for shipment to Latin America and Europe. Lower US oil demand since the economic downturn has also contributed, and seaborne product exports reached 120mt in 2013, up from 70mt in 2009. Alongside global shifts in the location of refinery capacity and oil demand growth, these trends have transformed seaborne oil trade patterns.

The impact could be similarly profound in the gas sector. As US imports of gas, mostly LNG, have dropped (on average by 34% per year since 2010), plans to add up to nearly 100mtpa of liquefaction capacity by 2020 could mean the US eventually emerges as a major LNG exporter, potentially accounting for 15% of global capacity (from 0.5% currently). Meanwhile, LPG shipments are continuing to accelerate strongly, rising by more than 60% y-o-y so far in 2014 to 6mt.

Miners Under Pressure

There has also been an impact in the dry bulk sector. Lower domestic gas prices have pushed the share of coal in US energy use to below 20%, leaving miners with excess coal supplies. US steam coal exports jumped to 48mt in 2012 from 11mt in 2009, contributing to lower global coal prices (cutting mining margins) and higher Asian import demand.

So What Next?

So the effects of the changing balance in the US energy sector have been far-reaching, and there remains scope for more shifts to occur as trade patterns continue to adjust to changes in commodity supply and prices. While the firm pace of expansion in US oil and gas output may start to slow, any change to existing export policies could have further impact. What is clear already, in terms of seaborne trade growth, is that the focus has shifted away from US imports, for decades a key driver of the expansion of global volumes, towards the country’s developing role as an energy exporter.


In the classic movie The Seven-Year Itch, hero Richard Sherman is left sweltering in his Manhattan flat as wife and kids head for the beach. A daunting prospect, until Marilyn Monroe turns up in the flat below. That’s where the fantasy starts as Richard exercises his “seven-year itch” in an amusingly unlikely relationship with the charismatic Monroe.

Shipping’s Seven-Year Fantasy

2014 has been a hot summer in Europe and shipping investors have been getting the seven-year itch themselves. Although the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 triggered the meltdown in rates, the seeds of the crash were sown exactly seven years ago on 10th August 2007. On that date the European banks became so suspicious of each other that the interbank market seized up. To celebrate, seven years later shipping investors are busy indulging their seven year itch with the residents of the flat below – not Monroe, but the equally attractive Asian shipyard representatives. 174m dwt of orders in 2013 and 66m in 1H 2014 show what a good time they’ve been having.

Cashing In At The Top

But how did the investors’ last big fling in August 2007 (273m dwt of orders were placed in full year 2007) turn out? Surely this was a bit of a disaster? Actually things did not turn out quite as badly as seemed likely when the market crashed. For example, a Suezmax resale costing $105m in August 2007 would have made around $57m trading since then, after OPEX (see chart). If this cash was used to pay down the vessel, the balance in August 2014 is $48m, compared with a market value of around $41m. Of course this does not take account of waiting, slow steaming and mishaps. But even allowing for these, it’s not the disastrous story veterans of the 1980s expected.

Off To A Good Start

Getting an investment off to a good start is vital and that’s what helped the 2007 investments shown in the chart. The accumulated cash flow of six August 2007 resale purchases shows that 50% of the cash was generated in the first year; 25-30% over the next 18 months; and very little in the last 4 years. For example the Cape generated only $6m between Dec 2010 and August 2014.

But the good news is that thanks to financial easing and near zero interest rates, residual values have remained firm. In 1985 a Panamax bulker delivered at a cost of $25m had a market value of around $8m. Today a Panamax bulk carrier ordered a couple of years ago at a cost of $29m has a resale value of $31m – it’s actually made money. So although the cashflow has been reminiscent of the 1980s, asset values this time round are a very different story.

7 Years On – Is the Cycle Over?

So there you have it. What looked like a disastrous shipping recession has turned out to be surprisingly benevolent, at least compared with the traumas of the 1980s. With shipyard credit available on a grand scale and not much in the secondhand market it’s a no-brainer – head east and you’ll find Marilyn standing over a subway ventilator. But don’t forget this is only a summer fantasy – the wife and kids will be back soon. Have a nice day.


Currently, the news seems full of warnings about the health of the Chinese economy. If it’s not worries over the extent of lending by the so-called “shadow banking” system, pessimists would have us believe that China is on the brink of a catastrophic housing bubble, or point to the impact of pollution reaching new highs in major Chinese cities. How should the shipping industry evaluate these issues?

What’s At Stake?

Of course, anything which harms the Chinese economy will generally be bad news. As the Graph of the Week shows, the Chinese economic miracle has been built on an import/export boom some distance in excess of the rest of the world’s efforts at trade growth, with Chinese trade growth accounting for over 90% of global expansion in some commodities.

The two drivers of the Chinese economic miracle which has transformed the shipping industries have been consumer exports, fuelled by cheap labour, and infrastructure investment in construction in China. These two factors are mutually interdependent: the share of the Chinese population living in cities has increased from 35% to 50% since 2000. All these new urbanites need housing, boosting construction. And what does this require? Steel, of course. Construction of housing for urban migrants, along with factories to employ them and services from shopping malls to roads and railways, has spurred Chinese seaborne iron ore imports to nearly 900mt p.a. The effect on the Capesize fleet needs no repeating.

If You Build It They Might Come

The real problem is not all of the construction is where it is needed: there are several virtually uninhabited brand new cities in Inner Mongolia, and a replica of central Paris (with Eiffel Tower!) in Zhejiang province. Signs of a slowdown in these sorts of construction projects have contributed to iron ore prices at the lowest levels in nearly 2 years.

Much of the construction effort of the last few years has been fuelled by fairly easy access to credit, with less conventional “shadow” credit a worry for some. Consumers have also taken on debt to increase their spending power. As more citizens begin to drive cars, oil import demand is stimulated. As they gain disposable income, demand is also generated for goods which drive expanded intra-Asian container trade and a greater need for imported manufacturing materials.

Pollution is another problem China now seems to be taking seriously. This is a bearish sign for areas of heavy industry including iron ore and crude oil importers, particularly the large number of steel mills in Hebei province, near Beijing.

Bad News? Or Not?

So, negative talk about the Chinese economy abounds. But time and again in the last decade, China has surprised (sometimes with the help of a little fiscal stimulus, admittedly), and a controlled deceleration remains the most likely outcome. Reports suggest that GDP growth will struggle to meet Beijing’s target of 7.5% this year. But a near miss would still be a growth rate that most other economies would love to be faced with. Moreover, industrial production in June was up 9.2% year-on-year, the fastest rate this year: maybe China still has the ability to surpass expectations. Have a nice day.


According to Oscar Wilde, a cynic is a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. He haggles endlessly over a few hundred thousand dollars on a $20 million ship, when its real “value” is nothing like $20 million. Wilde also mentions “sentimentalists” who are seized by ideas like “the world’s biggest ship”, without really grasping the economics needed to make them work.

The “Price” Is Right

In both cases the key distinction is between the cash which changes hands and the value received in return. In shipping cash is exchanged for a ship and investors can easily check that it’s the right price from brokers’ reports. Another price check is to compare the ship price over time (the blue line in the graph plots the price of a 5 year old Panamax bulker) with the price suggested by a model based on spot earnings and newbuilding prices (the red line plots the price calculated by a regression model – the fit is excellent with an R-squared of 0.9). Currently brokers are reporting $24m and the model says $20m, so the market price is a bit high? Or is it?

The “Value” Investment Model

Which brings us to the ship’s “value”. Back at start 1999 when a 5 year old Panamax bulkcarrier cost $12.5m, the “model” suggested that this was a bit expensive, and $10m was more in line with fundamentals. But anyone who paid $12.5m in 1999 was getting astonishing value. By start 2007 the ship, 13 years old, was worth about $31m and over the eight years it had earned about $42m on the spot market. Deduct operating costs and the $12.5m purchase price produces a very handy profit indeed.

That’s value, but for new investors who entered the market in late 2007, the value proposition was reversed. By then the 5-year-old Panamax had a price of $75m, and the model says it should be about $70m. So if you could snap it up for, say, $65m it’s a bargain … not. Unfortunately the future value “premium” proved to be negative and by start 2014 the 11-year-old ship was only worth $17m, a $58m loss. Spot earnings over the 6 years were about $33m thanks to strong markets in 2007/8 but after operating costs the loss is significant. So haggling over a $70m or $75m purchase price was not the issue. It was all about “value”.

Hidden Value Premium

Today the Panamax price is $24m and the model says it should be $20m. But what about its “value”? Is today more like January 1999, late 2007, or something in between? Not many punters would back the January 1999 value premium. Spikes like 2007/8 are far too rare, and with today’s economic problems the fundamentals are against it. But the market is pretty low, so negative value like 2007 seems equally unlikely too.

Cynics In Charge

So there you have it. Maybe shipping investors should be contemplating a fuzzy scenario in which they break even, and maybe make a bit of cash, but not much? Not the excitement they’re used to, but compared with other investments on offer, maybe not such a bad one. In which case, today’s price may be just as important as its value. Have a nice day.


OIMT201405Russia is forecast to account for 13% of world crude oil production and 18% of world natural gas production in 2014. While its prodigious Siberian flows tend to receive most of the credit for this feat, fields located off the country’s 16 million km of coastline are nonetheless projected to produce 390,000 bpd oil and 2.64 bcfd gas in 2014. So where exactly is Russian offshore production to be found? And what is the outlook?

Mastering the Arctic

As the Graph of the Month shows, offshore oil and gas production in Baltic & Arctic Russia stagnated after the break-up of the USSR, declining to 0.03m boepd in 2013, when it accounted for 4% of Russian offshore production. This trend was thrown into reverse when the Prirazlomnoye field came onstream in December 2013. Located 23km from shore in the Pechora Sea, the field is exploited via a ice-class platform and production is scheduled to reach 120,000 bpd by 2019. New technologies and robust oil prices are thus unlocking reserves hitherto stranded, and by 2023 Arctic oil and gas is forecast to constitute 11% of Russia’s offshore production.

Caspian and Crimean Conquests

Russia’s southern offshore fields, mainly in the Caspian, accounted for 9% of Russian offshore production in 2013. In the Caspian, as in the Arctic, harsh conditions have limited field development and disincentivised efforts to halt production decline. However, as in the Arctic, decline is now forecast to be arrested. Lukoil, for example, are planning substantial investment over the next four years at fields like Khvalynskoye and Yuri S. Kuvykin, where ice-class jack-up production units are likely to make development feasible. By 2023, the area is forecast to account for 24% of Russian offshore oil and gas production (excluding gas produced by fields off the Crimea, over which Russia now has de facto control, and which produced 410m cfd in 2013).

Expanding Eastwards

The Russian Far East is a relatively new area of offshore E&P. The Sakhalin-2 project started up in 1996 but offshore activity is still geographically limited, even if production volumes, at 0.78m boepd, are significant. The area accounted for 88% of Russian offshore production in 2013. Moreover, the Far East is Russia’s window on the developing economies of the Asia Pacific region, so companies are seeking to increase activity there, particularly with regards to LNG. In October 2013, the first Sakhalin-3 field, Kirinskoye, a subsea-to-shore development, began ramping up to 580m cfd. Further such field developments are planned out to 2023, when the area is projected to produce 0.95m boepd, its share falling to 65% despite new Capex due to faster Arctic and Caspian growth.

Thus production is forecast to grow in each of Russia’s offshore areas, driven largely by investment in high-spec jack-up, fixed platform and subsea field solutions. Total offshore oil production is projected to grow with a CAGR of 8.9% from 2014 to reach 890,000 bpd in 2023, and gas production likewise at 2.5% to reach 3.36 bcfd. Offshore would then account for 6.7% of the country’s oil and gas production, a far cry from the 2% nadir of post-Soviet decay.

Price indicators can tell market-watchers many things. In the volatile shipping markets they can provide a helpful window on both the health of today’s markets and expectations of future conditions. In the case of the latter, they may not be correct but it’s always interesting to take a look. So, how do price indicators help us gauge the state of play?

The Price Is Right?

In a “normal” market, or at least when owners have the expectation of one, the price of a 5-year-old ship should theoretically be about 75-80% of the price of the newbuilding, reflecting that merchant ships have a 20-25 year economic life and depreciate accordingly, other things being equal. The Graph of the Week shows the 5 year old to newbuild price ratio for a Capesize bulkcarrier, a VLCC tanker and a 2750 TEU containership for the last 10 years.

Bulk Better, Box Bottom

Well, today’s VLCC price ratio is right on the 75% mark, having dropped as low as 58% in late 2011. What does that tell us about expectations? Crude oil trade is a mature business with 1% growth expected in 2014, but VLCC fleet expansion is projected to be sub-2% this year, so that’s a better balance than for a while. On the dry side the Capesize price ratio (which once hit 160% as owners sought to get their hands on tonnage at the height of the boom) is flourishing at 90%. That might be a good representation of expectations, with sentiment seemingly fairly positive, Capesize fleet growth expected to slow to 4% in 2014 and iron ore trade expansion projected to motor on at 10% this year.

The ratio for the 2750 TEU containership is much lower, standing at 51%, almost as low as the 44% seen in 2009 (though it’s higher in some of the larger boxship sizes). Given the size of the surplus generated by the 9% downturn in trade in 2009, the box sector remains a bit further behind the curve than the bulk sectors. And here the difference in potential fuel efficiency between new designs and older ships is starker, pressuring the secondhand asset price further.

Downturn Downtime

So the ratios today seem fairly well aligned with market perceptions. But how have they fared since the onset of the downturn? Since September 2008, the Capesize ratio has spent just 33% of the time below the 75% line. The VLCC ratio has spent 65% of the time below 75% but only 29% of the time below 65%. So, in those sectors the impact on asset pricing could have been worse.

Was It So Bad?

The downturns in the 1970s and 1980s were far harsher on asset prices. In the late 1970s the ratio for both a Panamax bulker and for an Aframax tanker dipped as low as 40%. Interest rates were much higher, and the banks were much quicker to foreclose on “distressed” assets. This time, despite the slump in 2008, the price ratios haven’t suffered so dramatically (in the bulk markets at least) and investor appetite remains. However, part of that is a reflection of today’s expectations and time will tell how well investors have forecast future market developments. Have a nice day.


How fast will ship demand grow? It’s the ultimate question for serious shipping investors. Today’s global economy relies on owners stepping up to invest in the ships that will be needed in the future ($115 billion was invested in new contracts last year). With so much cash on the table, the future trade growth issue cannot be ignored. But it’s tricky and even experienced analysts fall back on “rules of thumb”.

Faster Than World GDP

When they worry about the future most shipping investors have the world economy at the back of their minds. But although world GDP is the obvious starting point for analysing sea transport, the relationship between the world economy and seaborne trade growth needs handling with care. Unfortunately things do not always turn out the way investors expect.

For example, over the 50 years since 1963 these two key ship demand variables have increased by a not too dissimilar amount. GDP grew on average at 3.7% p.a. and sea trade grew at 4.5% pa. Overall trade volume increased 722% and GDP by 501%. If the relationship had been steady, the ratio of trade to GDP would have followed the path shown by the dotted line on the graph, moving steadily up from 100% in 1963 to 137% in 2013 (i.e. the sea trade index 37% higher than the GDP index, both of which were 100 in 1963). Interestingly today’s GDP forecasts are close to the 50 year trend, with projected growth of 3.6% in 2014 and 3.9% in 2015. So does that mean about 4.5% trade growth?

Sea Trade Multiplier?

That’s not always how things happen. The red line shows that the “sea trade multiplier”, which compares the cumulative year by year growth in the sea trade and GDP indices since 1963, was all over the shop. In the 1960s trade shot ahead of GDP and the multiplier reached 160% in 1974. Then the relationship reversed and in the period 1980-88 sea trade growth averaged only 0.4% pa compared with 3.2% pa for GDP. Again in 2005-09 trade lost ground as GDP growth averaged 3.5% pa and trade only 2.4%.

Structural Changes

This analysis suggests that when looking ahead more than a year or two, the structural changes that lie ahead are more interesting than the trend. The 1960s boom was driven by the OECD countries adjusting to global free trade by importing massive quantities of bulk commodities like iron ore and oil. Then the trade collapse in the 1980s was a structural response to high oil prices. And the trade slowdown in the late 2000s shows that the slowing OECD economies (less growth and more services) were important enough to shave the top off the Chinese mega-boom.

Brave New World

So, demand trends are all very well, but structural changes may matter more. Today high energy prices are squeezing the oil trade and the non-OECD world, which is increasingly important, seems to be moving into a different phase of growth. Although the 4.5% trade growth “multiplier” scenario looks convincing, remember that it is during structural changes that shipping fortunes are often made and lost. Have a nice day.


Changes in the composition of the world fleet are nothing new, and have been a recurring theme throughout the history of the shipping industry. The twenty-first century has been no exception. At the start of 2000 the world fleet totalled 788 million dwt, but today’s fleet and orderbook combined total more than 2.0 billion dwt, and alongside this expansion the make-up of the fleet has also continued to change.

Bulk Boom Bulge

Clarkson Research tracks the world fleet and orderbook of over 90,000 ships. The Graph of the Week shows the difference in each vessel sector’s share of the total fleet in terms of both vessel numbers and dwt capacity, comparing start 2000 to today’s fleet and orderbook combined. It comes as no surprise that the clearest gain in share belongs to the bulkcarrier sector. During the ordering boom of the mid-2000s bulkers were often the investors’ ship of choice, spurred on by ramped up earnings and dry bulk trade growth averaging 7% during the period 2003-07. On the basis of today’s fleet and orderbook, bulkers account for a 11% greater share of world fleet dwt than at start 2000, and a 4% larger share of fleet numbers.

The tanker fleet meanwhile has seen its share of the world fleet decline over the same period; the overall tanker fleet saw its share of dwt capacity fall by 8%. Although 317m dwt of tanker tonnage was ordered in the years 2003-08, activity in other sectors has seen the tanker tranche slim down. Crude oil trade growth this century has been limited to an average of 1% per annum, although more positive growth in oil products volumes (5% per annum on average) has driven requirement for product tankers, helping maintain the tanker share of vessel numbers.

Liner Alignment

On the liner side, the containership sector has seen a significant growth in its share of tonnage. Robust trade volume growth of an average of 8% per annum this century has ensured a requirement for rapid growth in capacity. However, that has not been the only factor. In capacity terms container tonnage has also benefitted over the period from the increasing containerization of general cargo trade. Whilst the containership share of global tonnage has increased from 8% to 13%, the shares constituted by general cargo ships, MPPs, ro-ros and reefers have all decreased in dwt and number terms.

What’s Next?

The world fleet product mix continues to evolve. The consensus view seems to be that the more rapid growth in requirement for more specialised tonnage will see the share accounted for by, for example, gas, container and offshore units expand. In the period shown here, the offshore sector, led by the numerically strong OSV fleet, has already increased its vessel number share by almost 3%.

However ‘wildcards’ also come into play(few foresaw boxships as large as 18,000 TEU back in 2000) and ordering patterns are determined by a range of factors not just demand fundamentals. If prices look attractive, shipping investors often turn back to the sectors in which they are comfortable, and the composition of the fleet doesn’t always evolve as it seems it logically should. So, for the latest trends, watch this space. Have a nice day.