Archives for posts with tag: Overview

The shipping industry has long provided investors with opportunities for asset play, reflecting the volatility in prices and relative shifts in the value of certain classes or ages of ships. Recent months have been no exception, with changes in tempo clearly evident in some shipping sectors. What can conducting a quick survey of the classic asset market indicators tell us today?

Classical Repertoire

One classic indicator (see SIW 1175) of the state of the asset market in any particular sector is the ratio of the 5 year old price to the newbuild price of a similar ship. On the basis of a 25 year lifespan, a 5 year old vessel depreciating evenly would be worth around 80% of the newbuild price. The level of this ratio can demonstrate how keen investors are to purchase assets on the water today.

Change Of Tempo

The graph shows the 5 year old to newbuild price ratio for a Capesize and a VLCC. The ratio is clearly volatile, and recent trends in the Capesize sector are illustrative of how conditions in shipping asset markets can change rapidly. Since the start of 2009, the Capesize ratio has fluctuated within a wide range from 50% (reached in early 2009 and again in early 2016) to 110% (although this was still well below the peak of 160% in mid-2008 at the height of the boom). The ratio has also moved significantly even in the last few weeks, as Capesize secondhand prices have risen robustly. At the end of February 2017, the 5 year old Capesize price stood at $25m, 60% of the newbuild price. By the end of March, the 5 year old price had risen to $33.5m, 80% of the newbuild price and the highest ratio since autumn 2014, indicating the improved appetite for tonnage in the bulker market.

New World Or Old Classics?

While these trends in asset price ratios can indicate the market’s view on the relative value of newbuild and secondhand tonnage, changes in the ratio can sometimes subsequently impact on decision making by investors. When the ratio falls to low levels (the Capesize ratio remained below 70% from Jan-15 to Feb-17), secondhand purchases can often appear more attractive than newbuildings, whilst higher ratios can sometimes eventually stimulate newbuild interest.

Orchestrating Opportunities

Even more starkly, the volatility in price ratios reinforces the opportunities for asset play in the shipping markets. To take an example, a 5 year old Capesize vessel one year ago could have been picked up for about $23.75m. Trading the vessel on a 1-year timecharter (around $8,000/day at the time) and selling the unit as a 6 year old, for say $31.5m, would have generated a return of almost $8m after OPEX (34% of the original outlay).

Still Making Overtures?

So, even after a prolonged downturn, the classic indicators show a shipping market still volatile and open for asset play. Recent shifts, especially in the bulker sector, offer an excellent example. Whilst the outcome is always highly difficult to predict, there still appear to be opportunities for those willing to take a chance, hoping to hit the right note. Have a nice day!

SIW1267:Graph of the Week

After a long cycle of build-up in capacity in the 2000s, shipyards hit a new peak in global output in 2010. Since then, the impact of reduced vessel ordering on shipbuilders worldwide has been a key issue for the industry, and it’s clear that global output has dropped significantly and shipyard capacity has diminished. But how far can those shipyards still active look ahead today?

Looking Forward

‘Forward cover’ is one basic indicator of the volume of work that shipyards have on order, calculated by dividing the total orderbook by the last year’s output (in CGT). Unsurprisingly, after a period of extremely low ordering in 2016, forward cover has shortened. Currently, global forward cover stands at 2.3 years having declined throughout 2016, as the orderbook shrank by 25% in CGT terms. Global forward cover was as low as 2.1 years at the start of 2013 (but delivery volumes in 2012 were 37% higher than in 2016) and peaked at 5.6 years in 2008.

Looking around the shipbuilding world, yards in Korea currently have the lowest level of cover at 1.5 years. European yards, meanwhile, bucked the trend in 2016, increasing their forward cover on the back of cruise ship orders (and falling production volumes) to 4.2 years.

Less To Go Round

Fewer fresh orders have also led to a greater number of yards ending the year without receiving a single contract. During 2005-08, the number of yards to take at least one order was on average equivalent to 87% of the number of yards active (with at least one unit on order) at the start of the year. In 2009-15, with ordering generally lower, the figure averaged 49%. In 2016 this fell further to 28%, with just 133 yards receiving an order. In China, 48 yards (26 of which were state-backed) won an order in 2016 compared to 284 yards in 2007. In Japan, 22 yards took an order in 2016 compared to 60 as recently as 2015. In Korea, 11 shipyards took an order last year.

Out Of Work?

Whilst many yards have tried to cope with the lower demand environment by slowing production or working outside their traditional product range, the statistics clearly point to huge challenges. In 2016, 117 yards delivered the final unit on their orderbook. The peak production level of these yards, many of them smaller builders, totals around 4m CGT. However, 163 yards are scheduled to deliver their current orderbook by the end of 2017 (although in reality slippage may mean some of the work runs on past the end of the year). Statistically, this represents 43% of the number of yards active at the start of the year. Although these yards have been reining back capacity and outputting less in recent years, the peak production level of this set of yards totals as much as 12m CGT. Offshore builders of course face huge pressures too, with about half of those active scheduled to deliver their final unit on order this year.

Global shipyard output and capacity have fallen significantly since the peak years. However, many remaining yards still don’t need to look too far ahead to see the end of their current workload. The shipbuilding industry will be hoping to see a return to a more active newbuilding market sooner rather than later.

SIW1263

During July 2016, the containership fleet reached a landmark 20 million TEU in terms of aggregate capacity. To many it only seems like yesterday when the boxship fleet passed the 10 million TEU mark, back in April 2007. It took less than 10 years to double in capacity to reach the new milestone. Sprightly fleet growth indeed, but how rapid is it when compared to other parts of the world fleet?

Compound Crazy

Albert Einstein once called the impact of compound growth the ‘most powerful force in the universe’, and containership fleet capacity is a great example of this power. Total boxship capacity doubled from 5m TEU in size (in April 2001) to 10m TEU (in May 2007) in 6.2 years, and since then it has doubled in size again from 10m TEU to an astounding 20m TEU across just a further 9.3 years.

This rapid growth of the containership sector is a fairly well known story. In many respects the box sector is still a youthful part of the shipping world; since the inception of container shipping in the 1950s, the fleet has grown quickly from humble origins as trade has flourished. At the same time the fleet has upsized at a phenomenal rate. The average size of containerships in the fleet stood at 1,807 TEU in April 2001 and increased to 2,425 TEU in May 2007. Today, with behemoth boxships of over 19,000 TEU on the water, the average size of units in the fleet is 3,832 TEU, and the average size of those on order is even larger at 8,030 TEU.

Maturing Slowly

In contrast, some other shipping sectors can seem more ‘mature’, growing at a gentler rate. Tanker fleet capacity took almost 21 years to double to reach its current size of 540.9m dwt. In relative terms, the trade is indeed fairly mature, with average growth in volumes of 2.2% per annum over the last 20 years in combined crude and products trade. But interestingly, this is a sector now seeing rapid capacity growth, with an uptick in trade growth in recent years driving tanker ordering. In the last 19 months tanker fleet capacity has grown by 6.5%.

Bulk Bulge

However, the bulkcarrier fleet comfortably illustrates that the boxship sector has not been alone in experiencing rocketing growth. Although the vessels themselves may not have seen the same upsizing as boxships, bulker capacity expansion has been extraordinarily fast in recent times. Astonishingly, it took just 8.6 years from January 2008 to double to its current capacity of 784.1m dwt (though it had taken around 21 years before that to double previously). Nevertheless, bulker capacity expansion has slowed now, as dry bulk trade growth has hit the buffers.

Boom Time

So, the latest instance of a rapid doubling of fleet capacity is not a one-off. The explosion of boxship capacity has indeed been rapid, but in a world where shipbuilding output was hitting all-time highs not long ago, such growth has been a wider phenomenon. The overall world fleet has increased by 55% in dwt terms in the period since the onset of the global financial crisis in September 2008 alone. That’s a robust compound annual growth rate of 5.1%! Have a nice day, Einstein!

SIW1236 Graph of the Week

Generally, shipping industry watchers spend much of their time monitoring events out to sea: how fleets are evolving, trade volumes growing and freight rates performing. But occasionally it can be worth pointing the telescope in the other direction, and spending time considering how events on land can affect the industry. One such major land-based change has been the development of US shale oil and gas.

What No-One Saw Coming

Back in 2009, few would have dared predict that new fracking technologies would allow the US to add 10m boepd of unconventional output across a five year period. This is roughly the same net volume as was added to global offshore output between 2000 and 2015. The offshore markets have been amongst the hardest hit by the oversupply, and cuts in investment will make it harder to add to the 46.9m boepd set to be produced offshore globally in 2016. Since the oil price slump, rig rates have dropped by more than 50%, OSV rates by more than 35%, and today more than 300 rigs and 1,400 OSVs are laid up.

Shale In The Sights

One of the main factors which helped shale fracking to become widespread was the rapid recovery of the oil price after the 2009 downturn. This, of course, also helped the offshore sector have its day in the sun, before the downturn. But shale’s growth also had an impact on other shipping segments. US LPG exports grew at a CAGR of 71% in 2010-15. The growth of shale gas even led to proposals for the first transatlantic exports of ethane derived from it, and orders for ‘VLECs’ vessels followed.

The rise of shale gas also changed the LNG trade fundamentally. In 2010, US LNG imports were expected to be a major growth area. Today, the US has 117mt of under-utilised LNG import infrastructure (imports were just 1.86mt in 2015). Some projects have been converted to liquefaction, and up to 250mt of export capacity was mooted. One new project, Sabine Pass, is now exporting.

Telescoping Tank Capacity

Growth of US shale substantially reduced US import demand for light crudes. This primarily affected imports from West Africa. The transatlantic trade on Suezmaxes and Aframaxes fell from 1.8m bpd in 2010 to 0.3m bpd in 2014. But a 1975 ban on US crude exports prevented tanker exports of surplus oil, much of which is light grades for which US refineries were not ideally configured. US Jones Act tankers and tank barges benefited, as limited fleet supply for upcoast voyages sent coastal timecharter rates as high as $140,000/day in mid-2015, but there was no similar effect on international trade.

The US government has now eased the export restrictions, but this has come as lower oil prices have hit the rig count and output onshore. The lower oil price has caused shale to go into decline. Yet it has provided a nice boost for tanker trades, as low oil prices have stimulated oil demand from transportation and industry.

So, developments in the mid-west of America have had major ramifications for energy shipping and offshore markets globally. This is set to continue as the industry waits to see how shale responds to the slight oil price gain over Q2 2016. This only goes to demonstrate the need to keep this related land-based industry under surveillance. Have a nice day.

SIW1225

With the Test cricket season in England just starting, there’s plenty of attention on batsmen facing up to tricky deliveries. In the world of shipping, however, much of the supply-side discussion so far this year has opened up with a focus on the severe lack of contracting or the increased levels of demolition, whilst the examination of ship deliveries has remained down the order…

Testing Times

The delivery run-rate is a vital supply-side lever. As part of the ‘market mechanism’, when the earnings environment gets tough deliveries will typically moderate to adjust, either in the long-run as a result of reduced ordering or in the short-term as scheduled deliveries are delayed or cancelled. In this way, market conditions mitigate against the addition of further capacity, attempting to rebalance supply with demand, and a range of drivers come into play. Testing market conditions incentivise owners to attempt to delay or cancel existing orders. Difficulties in finalising finance also put pressure on the completion of deliveries, and in addition yards can also run into problems in perilous markets, impinging on their ability to deliver capacity on time or at all.

On The Back Foot

One way of measuring the stress on deliveries is to look at ‘non-delivery’ due to slippage (delay) or cancellation of orders, comparing actual deliveries to the start year scheduled orderbook. In 2015, in dwt terms, non-delivery of the shipping orderbook stood at 35%. With the sector under extreme pressure, bulkcarrier non-delivery stood at 42% in 2015, and is running at 56% in the year to date. In another sector under pressure, containership non-delivery stood at 13% last year but has since then increased dramatically. In offshore, where market conditions are the worst since the 1980s, non-delivery in unit terms last year stood at 42% and in the year to date stands at 60%. Clearly non-delivery is a significant supply side lever, and in the year to date, across all types it stands at 51% (in dwt).

Deliveries Fast Or Slow

So even though overall deliveries as a whole are projected to grow marginally by 5% in 2016 to 102m dwt, the impact of non-delivery is clear. Across the full year it is projected that 40% of the start year orderbook won’t get delivered. World fleet growth looks set to slow to around 2.7% (from 3.3% in 2015), compared to the 6.4% that would have been the case if the start year orderbook had been delivered to schedule in full this year. The missing 67m dwt of projected ‘non-delivered’ capacity is more than 25% larger than the full year demolition projection, so in the here and now delivery dynamics are having at least as big an impact as the recycling of tonnage.

Balancing The Attack?

So although in general the majority of ships on order still get delivered in the end, it is crucial to track delivery trends. This year every 10% of orderbook ‘non-delivery’ is equivalent to about 1% of growth in the world fleet. That clearly matters, and with the orderbook not necessarily a great guide to supply growth in difficult market conditions, deliveries, as well as ordering and demolition trends, remain essential to understanding the development of the market mechanism.

SIW1222

Along with cyclicality (see SIW 1219), the other characteristic of the shipping markets which receives frequent mention is volatility. This is so evident that the shipping markets are often reported to be many times more volatile than the stock markets or other fluctuating economic variables. Here we take a look at some metrics which shine some light on the relative volatility of the industry.

Measuring The Waves

Many metrics can be used to measure aspects of volatility (though none are perfect). A few are calculated here to compare volatility in the shipping markets with that in the stock and commodity markets. One classic measure of volatility is the ‘coefficient of variation’ which takes the standard deviation of a series over time (a measure of the degree of dispersion of observations in a series) and divides it by the mean (average) level of the series.

Volatile Business

This metric highlights the degree of volatility present in the shipping markets (see graph). For the ClarkSea Index it stands at 50%, for VLCC spot earnings 73% and Capesize spot earnings 104%. For the FTSE-100 the figure stands at 29% and for the S&P 500 43%. The stock markets, often thought highly capricious, appear to be quite a bit less volatile than shipping on this basis (and given that stock markets generally track a trend rather than a cycle, one might have expected their coefficients to be biased upwards). The oil price compares more closely to shipping; the figure for Brent crude stands at 73%. Another useful metric is the average absolute monthly change as a percentage of the mean. For the ClarkSea Index this stands at 8%, for VLCC spot earnings at 26% and Capesize spot earnings 18%. For the FTSE-100 and S&P 500 this stands at around 3% and for Brent at around 6%, so again much lower.

Of course this analysis doesn’t capture everything. It excludes week-to-week (or day-to-day) volatility, though one might suppose that this could further emphasise shipping’s volatility (for example, see VLCC spot earnings on page 2). Equally it does not handle (or ‘de-trend’) indicators differently to account for the fact that stock markets typically follow a long-term trend, rather than a cycle like shipping.

Variation On A Theme?

But, even using a regression approach to ascertain variation from simple trend levels, over 60% of the FTSE-100 movement is explained by the trend. In shipping, much more of the variation appears to remain ‘unexplained’ (less than 10% of the variation of the ClarkSea Index would be accounted for by a simple trend).

Need Good Sea Legs?

So, volatility in shipping easily holds its own against fluctuations in other economic phenomena. It’s a competitive business, and rapid changes in pricing can be driven by the steepness of the supply curve at the margins, as well as a range of quite unpredictable factors. This helps make shipping interesting for asset players and short-term speculators but tricky for investors looking for certainty of return and analysts looking for a clear picture. Like seafarers themselves, shipping market players can quite rightly point to having the stomach for ups and downs as much as anyone. Have a nice day.

SIW1220

As the pace of growth in Chinese seaborne imports has slowed, and prospects for a return to stronger rates of expansion appear to have diminished, focus on the potential for other countries to help provide impetus to global seaborne trade growth has increased. With an economy expanding at a robust pace, and a population close to China’s, India has increasingly featured in the spotlight.

The Big Bang

China’s dramatic growth and increased raw material demand since the turn of the century propelled world seaborne trade to new heights. By 2014, China’s imports of dry bulk goods, crude oil and oil products reached 1,850mt, 1,600mt more than in 2000. China’s industry-led development saw unparalleled growth in steel output, whilst refinery capacity and coal imports surged. But with coal demand and steel output falling, imports stalled in 2015.

A Dimmer Light?

This rapid expansion in China’s imports occurred fairly quickly, and comparison to a ‘base year’ shows that Indian imports are tracking behind China’s progression. In 2000, China’s GDP per capita stood at US$1,000, and the country’s dry bulk and oil imports topped 200mt. India reached both of these milestones in 2007, and since then, Indian imports have risen by 280mt to around 500mt, compared to China’s 950mt of extra imports between 2000 and 2009. Differing political systems and economies have clearly proved key. Industry accounts for a greater share of China’s GDP than India’s, whilst 25% of growth in the value of India’s trade in the last ten years (in both goods and services) was accounted for by the service sector, compared to 12% for China.

Reaching For The Stars

The concern for some shipping sectors is that the pace of growth in India’s import volumes already appears to be slowing, partly as targets for thermal coal self-sufficiency have undermined coal imports since mid-2015. Meanwhile, India is aiming to become a ‘global manufacturing hub’, with ambitious targets to treble steel production capacity to 300mt by 2025. However, the steel industry globally is currently under severe stress, and it is also unclear to what extent output growth may boost iron ore imports given India’s domestic ore reserves.

What Do The Skies Hold?

Nevertheless, India seems to hold plenty of potential in some areas. The outlook for imports of coking coal, crude oil and oil products still appears positive. And at a macro level, in 2015, India’s dry bulk and oil imports represented 0.4 tonnes per capita, below the global average of 1.0 tonnes per capita. Bringing India towards this level could generate significant additional import volumes.

So, the stars don’t seem to be in a hurry to line up Indian imports for growth on this explosive scale for now, with coal imports likely to fall further. But this may not be the end of the story. Growth in India’s refinery capacity, steel production, GDP and population looks set to outpace China’s in the coming years. Whilst Indian imports may not dazzle in some areas as brightly as China’s have, the shipping industry will still be hoping they may provide some sparkle in others.

SIW1217