Archives for posts with tag: orderbook

As in many sectors of economic activity, provision of just the right amount of capacity is a tricky business, and the shipbuilding industry is no exception. As a result, in stronger markets the ‘lead time’ between ordering and delivery extends and owners can face a substantial wait to get their hands on newbuild tonnage, whilst in weaker markets the ‘lead time’ drops with yard space more readily available.

What’s The Lead?

So shipyard ‘lead time’ can be a useful indicator, but how best to measure it? One way is to examine the data and take the average time to the original scheduled delivery of contracts placed each month. The graph shows the 6-month moving average (6mma) of this over 20 years. When lead time ‘lengthens’, it reflects the fact that shipyards are relatively busy, with capacity well-utilised, and have the ability, and confidence, to take orders with delivery scheduled a number of years ahead. For shipowners longer lead times reflect a greater degree of faith in market conditions, supporting transactions which will not see assets delivered for some years hence. Longer lead times generally build up in stronger markets. Just when owners want ships to capitalise on market conditions, they can’t get them so easily. But lead times shrink when markets are weak; just when owners don’t want tonnage, conversely it’s easier to get. The graph comparing the lead time indicator and the ClarkSea Index illustrates this correlation perfectly.

Stretching The Lead

Never was this clearer than in the boom of the 2000s. Demand for newbuilds increased robustly as markets boomed. The ClarkSea Index surged to $40,000/day and yards became more greatly utilised even with the addition of new shipbuilding capacity, most notably in China. The 6mma of contract lead time jumped by 49% from 23 months to 35 months between start 2002 and start 2005. By the peak of the boom, owners were facing record average lead times of more than 40 months. In reality, as ‘slippage’ ensued, many units took even longer to actually deliver than originally scheduled.

Shrinking Lead

The market slumped after the onset of the financial crisis, with the ClarkSea Index averaging below $12,000/day in this decade so far. Lead times have dropped sharply, with yards today left with an eroding future book. The monthly lead time metric has averaged 26 months in the 2010s, despite support from ‘long-lead’ orders (such as cruise ships) and reductions in yard capacity. Of course, volatility in lead time recently reflects much more limited ordering volumes.

Taking A New Lead

So, ‘lead times’ are another good indicator of the health of the markets, expanding and contracting to reflect the balance of the demand for and supply of shipyard capacity. They also tell us much about the potential health of the shipbuilding industry. In addition, even if shorter lead times indicate the potential to access fresh tonnage more promptly, unless demand shifts significantly or yards can price to attract further capacity take-up quickly, they might just herald an oncoming slowdown in supply growth. At least that might be one positive ‘lead’ from this investigation. Have a nice day.


Despite the many domestic and market challenges facing the Hellenic ship owning community, Greece has continued to strengthen its position as the largest ship owning nation in recent years. As the shipping community begins to gather for another Posidonia, Greek owners today control some 18% of the world fleet, with a 333m dwt fleet on the water and a further 40m dwt on order.

Greek owners continue to top the league table of ship owning nations with a 196m GT fleet and global market share of 16% (by GT), followed by Japan (13%), China (11%) and Germany (7%). In recent years this position has in fact been consolidated, with the Greek fleet growing by over 7% in 2015 – the most significant growth of all major owning nations. Aggregate growth since 2009 is even more significant; some 70% in tonnage terms. The big loser in market share in recent years has been Germany, while China’s aggressive growth in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis has slowed (the Chinese fleet doubled between 2009 and 2012 as solutions were found to distressed shipyard orders). Athens/Piraeus also features as the largest owning cluster globally, with Tokyo, Hamburg, Singapore and Hong Kong/Shenzhen making up the top five.

Punching Above Their Weight!

Greek owners remain the classic “cross traders”, developing their market leading position as the bulk shipping system evolved in the second-half of the twentieth century. Today, the Greek owners’ share of the world fleet at 16% compares to a seaborne trade share for Greece of less than 1%. By contrast, Chinese owners control 11% of the world fleet relative to the Chinese economy contributing to 16% of seaborne trade.

Sticking With Wet And Dry

Although a number of Greek owners have diversified into other shipping sectors, Greek owners have generally retained a focus on the “wet” and “dry” sectors. Today, the Greek fleet is largely made up of bulkcarriers (47% by GT) and tankers (35%) with this combined share hovering around 85% for most of the past twenty years. There has been some development of the Greek owned containership fleet (up to an 11% share) and gas carriers (up to a 4% share) but this is still generally limited. By contrast, Norwegian owners have trended towards more specialised vessels (e.g. offshore, car carriers) and the German fleet has remained liner focused.

Asset Players

Greek owners have also retained their role as shipping’s leading asset players and today operate a fleet with a value of some $91 billion (actually third in the rankings behind the US due to the value weighting of the cruise fleet). In 2015, Greek owners were the number one buyers (followed by China) and number one sellers (followed by Japan and Germany) in the sale and purchase market. Greeks have not been quite so dominant in the newbuild market recently and in 2015, Greek owners ($6.9bn of orders) trailed Japan ($13.1bn) and China ($10.7bn) in the investment rankings.

So despite facing many challenges, Greek owners continue to “punch above their weight” as the world’s leading shipowners for yet another year!


With the Test cricket season in England just starting, there’s plenty of attention on batsmen facing up to tricky deliveries. In the world of shipping, however, much of the supply-side discussion so far this year has opened up with a focus on the severe lack of contracting or the increased levels of demolition, whilst the examination of ship deliveries has remained down the order…

Testing Times

The delivery run-rate is a vital supply-side lever. As part of the ‘market mechanism’, when the earnings environment gets tough deliveries will typically moderate to adjust, either in the long-run as a result of reduced ordering or in the short-term as scheduled deliveries are delayed or cancelled. In this way, market conditions mitigate against the addition of further capacity, attempting to rebalance supply with demand, and a range of drivers come into play. Testing market conditions incentivise owners to attempt to delay or cancel existing orders. Difficulties in finalising finance also put pressure on the completion of deliveries, and in addition yards can also run into problems in perilous markets, impinging on their ability to deliver capacity on time or at all.

On The Back Foot

One way of measuring the stress on deliveries is to look at ‘non-delivery’ due to slippage (delay) or cancellation of orders, comparing actual deliveries to the start year scheduled orderbook. In 2015, in dwt terms, non-delivery of the shipping orderbook stood at 35%. With the sector under extreme pressure, bulkcarrier non-delivery stood at 42% in 2015, and is running at 56% in the year to date. In another sector under pressure, containership non-delivery stood at 13% last year but has since then increased dramatically. In offshore, where market conditions are the worst since the 1980s, non-delivery in unit terms last year stood at 42% and in the year to date stands at 60%. Clearly non-delivery is a significant supply side lever, and in the year to date, across all types it stands at 51% (in dwt).

Deliveries Fast Or Slow

So even though overall deliveries as a whole are projected to grow marginally by 5% in 2016 to 102m dwt, the impact of non-delivery is clear. Across the full year it is projected that 40% of the start year orderbook won’t get delivered. World fleet growth looks set to slow to around 2.7% (from 3.3% in 2015), compared to the 6.4% that would have been the case if the start year orderbook had been delivered to schedule in full this year. The missing 67m dwt of projected ‘non-delivered’ capacity is more than 25% larger than the full year demolition projection, so in the here and now delivery dynamics are having at least as big an impact as the recycling of tonnage.

Balancing The Attack?

So although in general the majority of ships on order still get delivered in the end, it is crucial to track delivery trends. This year every 10% of orderbook ‘non-delivery’ is equivalent to about 1% of growth in the world fleet. That clearly matters, and with the orderbook not necessarily a great guide to supply growth in difficult market conditions, deliveries, as well as ordering and demolition trends, remain essential to understanding the development of the market mechanism.


Today’s headlines often point towards the impact of the demand side on the state of health of the shipping markets. But despite the fact that today’s global orderbook appears less onerous than previously (at 16% of the fleet), capacity levels are still important, and a look at the future of the supply side can provide an idea of just how hard a balancing act the markets still face in today’s demand conditions.

Like The High-Wire?

An indicator combining capacity and demand elements gives an idea of how difficult it might be just to maintain the current supply-demand balance, before the surplus present in many sectors today can even be addressed. The graph shows a ratio which compares the orderbook as a percentage of the fleet to ‘current’ and ‘trend’ rates of demand growth in a selection of sectors (see graph description for details). At a high level, this broadly indicates how many years of demand growth the orderbook to be delivered over the next few years equates to, and how much the supply side will need to otherwise adjust to balance things out. In many cases, even after a sharp slowdown in ordering, this looks like a real high-wire act.

How Hard Does It Look?

The orderbook for oil tankers equates to 18% of the fleet, equivalent to 8 years of ‘current’ demand growth, so there could be some work to be done there to maintain today’s balance. However, it’s the bulkcarrier sector which really illustrates the impact of slower demand growth. Today’s orderbook, 15% of the fleet, equates to 11 years of ‘current’ demand growth. In the boxship sector, relatively faster trade growth (despite an historically slothful 2015) means that today’s orderbook equates to a perhaps more manageable 4 years of ‘current’ trade growth. Other sectors reinforce the impact of demand side issues. The LNG carrier orderbook equates to 14 years of ‘current’ trade expansion (although expectations might be for improved trade growth, and the figure drops to 3 years on the basis of the ‘trend’ rate), and for car carriers the figure stands at 13 years.

Balancing Acts

Of course, in market mechanics, it’s often the supply side which adjusts, and other factors not captured by the ratio used here can lend a hand. Demolition is one obvious factor, with, for example, the relative size of potential bulkcarrier capacity growth suppressed by record levels of demolition this year so far (14.1m dwt in Q1). Delay or cancellation of the orderbook also plays a role: 42% of start year scheduled bulkcarrier deliveries failed to enter the fleet in 2015. Changes in vessel productivity, such as adjustments to operating speeds, can also impact of the absorption of capacity in the future.

Still Walking The Tightrope

Nevertheless, shipping globally still appears to be walking a tightrope in the current demand environment. Today’s orderbook equates to 7 years of ‘current’ seaborne trade growth (a rate of 2.4%), though looks slightly less daunting (5 years) if demand growth was to reach the last decade’s ‘trend’ rate (3.4%). But in current demand conditions, even to maintain the status quo, there’s a significant supply-side balancing act to perform.


Well, 2015 was really quite a year. Brent opened in January at c.$49/bbl, the price having tumbled in Q4 2014; the subsequent rally, which saw it pass $65/bbl, was cut short, and in December, it fell past $37/bbl. Expectations of a brief correction were confounded, and with E&P cuts biting and oil still falling, offshore seems to be facing a multi-year downturn. But just how does 2015 compare to recent years?

Annus Horribilis

At the end of 2015, Brent stood at around $37/bbl, far below the $60-80/bbl envisaged by many analysts at the close of 2014. Through 2015, various factors conspired to maintain a supply glut and depress the price, including OPEC policy, the resilience of the US shale sector and the softening global economic outlook.

Oil companies reacted to weaker price expectations by cutting E&P budgets and slashing jobs. In the offshore space, oil companies cut E&P spending by around 19% on average. Exploration spending was hit particularly hard, but FIDs at offshore development projects in 2015 were also down approximately 49% y-o-y, as operators were reluctant to commit capital to long lead-time projects. Some offshore areas and fleet segments fared relatively better than others, but 2015 was a pretty bleak year overall.

Turbulent Waters

In terms of offshore field activity, 2015 was the worst year in over a decade. Although some 2015 offshore discoveries like Zohr and Hopkins were notable for their magnitude or fast-track potential, just 96 offshore fields were discovered globally in 2015, down 19% on 2014 and 41% on the 2005-14 average of 162 discoveries per annum.

Meanwhile, only 68 offshore fields started up in 2015, down 41% on both the 114 start-ups of 2014 and the 2005-14 average. In part, this reflected problems pre-dating the fall in the oil price, such as slippage, cost inflation and political risk in countries like Nigeria, Egypt and Brazil. However, due to the paucity of FIDs in 2015, the backlog of fields under development at start 2016 was down roughly 11% y-o-y, even with many planned 2015 field start-ups deferred into 2016 due to slippage. The subsea tree backlog also fell by around 19%, to 301 units.

Challenging Times

The fall-off in offshore field activity compounded developing supply-demand imbalances in the offshore fleet, most notably in the OSV and rig fleets, with an adverse effect on utilization and rates. Thus global rig utilization stood at 73% at end 2015, compared to 87% at end 2014 and 96% at end 2013. Day rates also diminished substantially, with high-spec drillships in the US GoM, for example, commanding $200-275,000/day at end 2015, compared to $600,000/day at the peak of the market cycle. In the OSV sector, falling rig moves and project activity helped depress rates: the North Sea term rate for an AHTS 20,000+ BHP, for instance, averaged $16,800/day, down 52% y-o-y. Moreover, many OSV owners felt compelled to lay up units – a trend still playing out. Offshore newbuild contracting suffered, too with contracting down by 68% on 2014, so that even with delivery delays, the orderbook at start 2016 stood at 1,157 units, down 26% on start 2015.

Troubling Portents

Thus in comparison to the last ten years, and the recent market peak in 2013/14 in particular, 2015 was challenging. The coming year is likely to be a tough one as well, with many energy companies set to make further E&P budget cuts of 20-40% and the oil price seemingly yet to bottom out. The halcyon days of $100+/bbl now seem like a long time ago indeed.

A sustained period of low oil prices has created a shortfall in offshore support vessel (OSV) demand, at a time when the sector has displayed rapid fleet expansion. Charter rates have fallen significantly, whilst the number of inactive vessels has reached record levels in some regions. An increase in vessel scrapping would seem to be an obvious solution to this problem, so why hasn’t this been the case so far?

Mirror The MODU Model?

OSV demand has fallen – at least 11% of the total fleet was laid up at start September. So far in 2015, 23 removals have been recorded from the OSV fleet (18 AHTS/AHT and 5 PSV/Supply vessels). For AHTS/AHTs this is a 29% increase on 2014 on an annualised basis. PSV removals, however, are down by 46%. In either case, the number of removals seems below what might be expected given the challenging market conditions.

For the AHTS sector in particular, rig moves provide an invaluable source of demand – a decrease in utilisation for these units has not been surprising given the sharp fall in E&P expenditure following the drop in oil prices. Oversupply is also a significant issue for the MODU market. However, the reaction from owners in that sector has been very different, as is evident from a net decrease of 15 units from the fleet so far in 2015.

The decrease in MODU numbers has been achieved in two ways. Firstly, by reducing the number of existing units – removals are currently up by 94% in 2015 on an annualised basis, already surpassing the record number of removals recorded for any full year. Secondly, the addition of newbuilds has been restricted, with the number of deliveries down by 39% in annualised terms in 2015.

Short-Term Gains

A likely reason for the low uptake in OSV removals relative to the MODU sector is that there is comparatively more value in scrapping rigs (in particular, floaters), compared to OSVs, on account of their larger size and steel content. Furthermore, it is relatively easy and cost-effective to lay-up or stack OSVs, which has been the preferred option for owners – at least 340 AHTSs and 254 PSVs are estimated to be laid up, although in reality this number may be even greater. Similarly, the sale of vessels for use in other sectors (e.g. utility support) provides some means of reducing active vessel numbers, although sales activity for OSVs in 2015 is currently down by 25% on an annualised basis.

However, whilst stacking of OSVs provides some respite for owners during times of oversupply, it can only be considered a short-term solution – especially given the size of the current OSV orderbook: the number of OSVs on order is equivalent to 11% of the active fleet and, although some slippage is expected, 293 units are slated for delivery by end 2015.

Long-Term Woes

The OSV dayrate index has fallen by 27% since the start of 2015 and, with no significant upturn in oil prices looking likely, pressures seem set to continue. Fleet growth stands at 2.3% y-o-y, and the issue of OSV oversupply is expected to remain significant. Against this background, the discussion of removals is likely to be ongoing theme.


Price ratios are a classic indicator used in a range of industries where assets depreciate over time. In the shipping sector, they can often tell us something about the perceived health of the market, and in particular about what investors are really willing to outlay to get their hands on assets that are on the water today compared to investing in a new vessel.

A Classic Ratio

One classic shipping market indicator is the ratio of the 5 year old price of a ship to the newbuild price of a similar vessel. On the basis of a 25 year lifespan, a 5 year old ship, depreciating on an even basis, would be worth around 80% of the newbuild price. However, if investors feel that the market is strong enough, they may be willing to pay a premium to get their hands on a secondhand vessel to operate in the market today. Conversely, if the earnings environment looks weak, investors may take a more negative view of the value of the existing asset.

The graph shows the 5yo/Newbuild price ratio for a VLCC tanker, a Panamax bulkcarrier and a 2750 TEU containership over time. Immediately apparent is that during the boom shipping market of the mid to late 2000s, the featured ratios stood well above the 80% line, and at times above 100% for all three vessel types, with the Panamax bulker ratio as high as 170% in late 2007. Since the downturn in 2008, the ratios have fallen. From one angle, it could have been worse; there was a period when all three ratios exceeded 80% (Mar 10-Jun 11). However, in general the ratios have been depressed, and there have been clear phases (Oct 08-Mar 09, Aug 12-Apr 13) when they have all been below 80%.

Ups And Downs

So what do the ratios tell us today? Tanker earnings have had a strong run since late 2014 but even so the VLCC price ratio stands only a little above 80%, maybe indicating that investor positivity is mixed with caution. Meanwhile, the bulker market is in severe recession and the Panamax price ratio has fallen from 95% during 2014 to 65%, showing how investors’ optimism has drained.

Lower Levels

The containership ratio, however, is on the up, with earnings recently improved. But it still stands at just 54%, perhaps indicating investors’ caution and relative preference for new tonnage. At boxships’ higher speeds, the difference in fuel efficiency between new and older tonnage is more marked, though the ratio was higher in the 2010-11 period when fresh interest arose in a sector that ‘looked cheap’.
Reading The Classics

So, price ratios are classic indicators, and as if it needed emphasising, today’s ratios show that the shipping markets aren’t perceived by investors to be close to full health yet. Overall sale and purchase volumes in the year to date are a little way behind last year’s levels, and the price ratios today might give an indication as to investors’ actual feelings about assets on the water. But markets change quickly, so just like classic cars which get taken out once in a while, it’s the same for classic indicators – and market watchers should probably take another reading soon. Have a nice day.