Archives for posts with tag: oil prices

In 2011, Nigerian oil production stood at 2.55m bpd (of which 71% was offshore), accounting for 7.1% of total OPEC oil production (and 40% of West African offshore oil production). Since then, Nigerian oil production has been eroded by exposure to political risk factors and weaker commodity prices, dropping to just 1.54m bpd in 2016. What, then, is the outlook for Nigerian oil production in 2017 and beyond?

A Rose-Tinted Past?

Nigeria has been an oil producing country for almost 60 years and its first producing offshore field came onstream in 1965. In the following decades, Nigerian offshore E&P was focused almost entirely in the shallow waters of the Niger Delta. Even today, there remain 104 active shallow water fields in Nigeria producing via 263 fixed platforms with an average age of 25 years. It was in the late 1990s that Nigerian E&P began moving further from shore, as oil companies sought new reserves to offset decline at mature shallow water fields. Deepwater fields were also less vulnerable to the militant activity plaguing the Delta for much of the 2000s. The first deepwater discovery in Nigeria was Abo, in 1996, which was the first such start-up too, in 2003. As of March 2017, 40 fields in water depths of at least 500m had been found off Nigeria, of which 10 had been brought onstream via a total of seven FPSOs and 253 subsea trees.

A Risky Proposition?

However, were it not for deleterious influences on Nigeria’s upstream sector in the last 10 or so years, deepwater E&P in the country could now be more prevalent still. The foremost difficulty has been the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was first introduced to the Nigerian Parliament in 2008 and which has yet to be passed. An especially contentious issue is mooted changes to deepwater fiscal terms, which IOCs argue would render deepwater projects (where breakevens tend to fall in the $60-90/bbl range) unviable. An uncertain investment climate has been compounded by court cases arising from alleged improper practices, for example at OPL 245, host to the stalled ZabaZaba project(100,00 bpd). So there have been few deepwater FIDs and just three such field start-ups off Nigeria since 2009 (versus 20 off Angola). There has thus been little deepwater oil production growth to offset onshore or shallow water field decline.

Stability Or Volatility?

Uncertainty about the PIB remains, but in 2016, disruption caused by militants, notably the Niger Delta Avengers, came to the fore: attacks on oil infrastructure saw oil production dip below 1.25m bpd at times in 2016. Moreover, weaker oil prices have hit government finances and so its ability to dampen unrest. Production recovered slightly in Q4 but conditions in the Delta remain febrile. And if oil production does continue to ramp back up to over 2.0m bpd, it could imperil gains in the oil price that followed the OPEC deal (Nigeria is exempt from quotas). If prices cannot climb above $60/bbl, there is little prospect of Nigerian deepwater projects (of which there are 13 with a total oil production capacity of over 0.81m bpd yet to be sanctioned) hitting FID any time soon.

So in the short term, Nigeria could prove a key factor in the global oil price equation. And in the long term, undoubtedly the country has a great deal of deepwater potential; however, before this is likely to be realised, numerous challenges need to be overcome. Nothing is certain.

OIMT201703

In the first film in the Bridget Jones series, 32 year old single Bridget soon ends up in the middle of a love triangle with the sensible Mark Darcy and charming Daniel Cleaver. The second sequel, released last year, sees Bridget finding herself unexpectedly expecting a baby. But Bridget Jones hasn’t been the only one battling tricky relationships and a rising headcount, as tanker owners will attest.

Happy Couple

The tanker market has certainly had some tumultuous times of late. Crude tanker earnings picked up in 2014, averaging nearly $27,000/day, and surged to an annual average of around $50,000/day in 2015. Things started to cool off into 2016, but in the full year average earnings were still fairly healthy at just under $30,000/day. They say two’s company; and these positive conditions did seem to have been brought about by the fortuitous lining up of two key factors.

Firstly, limited tanker ordering in the years after the global economic recession led to a spell of very muted growth in the tanker fleet. By the start of 2015, tanker fleet capacity was just 3% larger than at the start of 2013 (in the same period, the bulkcarrier fleet grew 10%). Secondly, the oil price crash in mid-2014 kick-started a period of unusually firm growth in seaborne oil trade. The ensuing low oil price environment supported healthy refinery margins and a build-up in oil inventories in key regions, whilst price pressures also dampened US oil production and boosted US crude imports. Overall, seaborne crude oil trade grew on average by a healthy 3.5% p.a. in 2015-16.

Delivery Record

However, a resurgence in contracting (1,278 tankers were ordered in 2013-15, up from 577 in 2010-12) has seen tanker fleet growth accelerate, to around 6% in 2016. The tanker supply surge has continued, with deliveries in January 2017 reaching an all-time monthly record of 6.7m dwt. With these new additions, tanker fleet capacity has already grown by 1.1% since the start of 2017, a similar rate of growth to that seen in full year 2014, with more tonnage delivered last month than in some whole years in the 1980s. In full year 2017, tanker fleet growth looks set to reach around 5%.

Troubling Trio

Another tricky element could also now be materialising on the demand side. Compliance by major oil exporters with agreed production cuts seems to have been high so far. The wider impact of these cuts on the tanker market is certainly far from clear, but there is the potential for improved oil price levels to support US oil output and undermine crude imports. At the same time, oil inventory drawdowns in some regions remain a key risk

Finding Mr Right

So, they say three’s a crowd, and the tanker market could be facing up to some real tests if the three factors of fast supply growth, changes in oil production and inventory drawdowns come together. Bridget Jones would be the first to tell you that finding the right way forward when the future’s uncertain and numbers are multiplying is tricky at the best of times, but rarely have shipowners not been up for a challenge. Have a nice day.

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The expansion of European settlement in North America – the pushing westwards of the frontier – has come to be seen as a defining part of American culture, spawning a whole genre of films and books set in the historical “Wild West”. That same pioneering spirit seems to be alive still today, at least in the US Gulf of Mexico (GoM), where 49 ultra-deepwater field discoveries have been made in the last decade.

Once Upon A Time In The Gulf

Offshore E&P in the US GoM began in the 1930s, picking up pace in the 1950s. By the end of 1975, a total of 444 shallow water fields had been discovered in the area and 256 of these had been brought into production. Gas fields predominated, accounting for 75% of discoveries and 31% of start-ups. Early E&P in the area made extensive use of jack-up drilling rigs and lift-boats. Fixed platforms were the favoured development method, with 86% of the 256 start-ups using fixed platforms. Thus were the first pioneering steps taken in exploiting the US GoM.

For A Few Dollars More

However, compelled by the need to find new reserves, oil companies active in the US GoM began pushing outwards, into deeper waters: the first deepwater discovery in the area was made in 1976. The frontier has now moved quite a way onwards since those early days. The average distance to shore of the 129 offshore discoveries in the area since start 2007 is 145km, while 72% (93) of these fields are in water depths of 500m or greater. The focus has also shifted from gas to oil: 58% of the 129 finds were oil fields, including 81% of the 93 deepwater finds. The US GoM has been dubbed one corner of the “Golden Triangle” of deepwater E&P and (supported by high oil prices until 2015) it has accounted for 16% and 19% of deepwater and ultra-deepwater finds globally since 2007. As shown by the graph, this was in spite of a slowdown in the wake of Deepwater Horizon. Floater utilisation dipped to 80% in 2011 but recovered, and a peak of 54 active floaters in the area was reached in January 2015 (26% of the active fleet).

Manifest Destiny?

So US GoM exploration was a major beneficiary of a high oil price. But how might it fare in a potential “lower for longer” price scenario? The outlook for jack-ups is bleak, with utilisation in the area standing at 24% as of December 2016. Simply put, the shallow water GoM is gas prone, and gas fields in the area are generally not competitive with onshore shale gas. At the US GoM (ultra-)deepwater frontier though, things do not look quite as bad as might be expected. On the one hand, over the last two years, floater utilisation has gradually fallen to 70%, as owners have struggled with rig oversupply, and dayrates are severely pressurised. On the other hand, there have been large finds made since 2014, such as Anchor and Power Nap, and wells are underway or planned for potentially major prospects such as Dawn Marie, Warrior, Castle Valley, Hershey, Hendrix, Sphinx and Dover. Many oil companies see the US GoM as a core area, and are prepared to invest to bolster oil reserves, even via drilling of, for example, costly HPHT reservoirs in the Lower Tertiary Wilcox formation.

As in the Wild West, at times things can be tough at offshore frontiers. Rig owners (and others) are experiencing this in the US GoM. But with some oil companies taking a long-term view, the pioneering spirit may not have been snuffed out yet.

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Two high-level indicators of vessel and structure demand in the offshore sector are energy prices and oil company E&P spending. A third, slightly more specific indicator is estimated offshore project capital expenditure, or CAPEX. While this metric does not capture demand arising from, for example, offshore exploration campaigns, it can be a key proxy for demand resulting from offshore EPC activity.

CAPEX Defined

Since the start of 2010, around $980bn of CAPEX has been committed to some 669 offshore projects globally. But just what makes up offshore project CAPEX? As defined herein, it consists of estimated capital invested in the development, redevelopment or decommissioning of offshore fields; it excludes spending on licensing rounds, seismic surveys and exploration wells, as well as operational expenditure arising from manning and IMR at active fields. CAPEX is committed via EPC contracts, usually issued soon after a project final investment decision (FID), for items such as MOPUs, fixed platforms, pipelines and subsea trees, as well as support, installation and development drilling services. CAPEX also translates into field developments that create durable demand for OSVs. CAPEX data collected by Clarksons Research is as specified by project operators; where no definitive figure is given, estimates are derived from assessment of comparable projects with known CAPEX.

Measuring CAPEX

One advantage of CAPEX as a metric is that, unlike a count of project FIDs, it reflects the differing ‘weight’ of projects. Indeed, project CAPEX can vary by several orders of magnitude. The B-173A Expansion project off India, for example, entailed the installation of a second shallow water fixed platform on the B-173A gas field. The project, which started up in 2015, had a reported price tag of $67m. In contrast, the ongoing 230,000 bpd Kaombo Ph.1 development off Angola has a reported CAPEX of $16bn. This wide variation in costs helps to explain recent CAPEX trends. During the 2011 to 2013 boom years, estimated CAPEX averaged $204bn p.a. globally, supported by high energy prices and rising E&P budgets. As oil prices tumbled in 2014, CAPEX fell by 54% y-o-y. CAPEX in 2015 was steady on 2014, even though FIDs fell by 41%, as a few giant projects with low breakevens, such as Johan Sverdrup (Norway, $12bn) and WND Ph.1 (Egypt, $12bn), received FIDs. However, other FIDs have continued to slip in the downturn. CAPEX so far in 2016 stands at around $40bn, down 34% y-o-y on an annualised basis.

CAPEX As An Indicator

As offshore CAPEX has fallen, EPC tendering has suffered, and hence, for example, MOPU newbuild contracting has dropped from an average of 18 units p.a. in 2010 to 2013, to just eight units in 2015 and two in 2016 to date. Similarly, 16 pipelayers were contracted in the same period, but only one unit has been ordered since 2013, reflecting depressed utilisation and earnings. Until CAPEX begins to increase once more, these sectors are likely to remain challenged.

In terms of spotting a recovery, then, it is worth keeping an eye on oil companies’ offshore project CAPEX plans. For not only is CAPEX one of a range of factors affecting offshore markets; it is a useful indicator with particular relevance to EPC-led vessel activity and investment too.

OIMT201609

The Indonesian government has been trying to reinvigorate investment in the country’s upstream oil and gas industry in the last few years. However, tough market conditions persist and political uncertainty remains a challenge. With oil companies seemingly losing interest in acreage offshore Indonesia, could offshore drilling demand in the country be running out of steam?

Ageing Problems

Indonesia is an OPEC member state and accounted for 16% (0.25m bpd) and 23% (3.67bn cfd) of offshore oil and gas production in SE Asia in 2015. However, oil and gas production off Indonesia declined by 4.7% from 2010 to 2015. In part this decline is because there have been few major discoveries to offset dwindling reserves at the country’s mature fields. Recently, operators have also been less willing to conduct additional development drilling on these depleting fields. As the Graph of the Month illustrates, offshore development drilling fell by 27% y-o-y between 2014 and 2015 and exploration drilling has also been subdued, with just two wells drilled in 2015, compared to 24 in 2014. Moreover, exploration has yielded only seven offshore discoveries since 2014, indicating that future development drilling demand could suffer as well.

Losing Interest

Problematic energy market fundamentals aside, political uncertainty has exacerbated the situation. The implementation of controversial Regulation 79/2010 in 2010 ended previous “assume and discharge” rules, meaning that new Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) could be subject to varying and arbitrary levels of tax previously “dischargeable”. Operators recoiled strongly, denting interest in PSCs, as demonstrated by lacklustre participation in the 2013 Licensing Round. Corrective actions have since been taken, but it created crippling uncertainty in Indonesia’s upstream sector. Looking ahead, low oil prices and a 30% downwards revision to the level of tax oil companies can offset with costs, operators could become even less willing to commit to offshore acreage. Only 6 out of 11 offshore PSCs were awarded in the 2014 tender round. Moreover, Total and Chevron intend to relinquish the Mahakam and East Kalimantan blocks, which will expire in 2017 and 2018 respectively. Of 115 offshore PSCs held as of end 2015, 39 are undergoing termination, and operators might opt to reduce or end drilling activity if they intend not to renew these PSCs.

Under Pressure

It appears operators are losing interest in acreage off Indonesia, which could translate into weaker drilling demand, though the government has been exploring ways to stimulate investment and may eventually broker deals to keep operators committed to major offshore PSCs and capital outlay. Additionally, the country’s NOC, Pertamina, reportedly could assume operatorship of over 50% of upstream acreage. These factors might improve drilling demand in the longer term.

At present however, Indonesia’s offshore sector is clearly challenged: against the backdrop of globally reduced offshore E&P, the country has its own regulatory uncertainties. These factors have led to reduced interest in offshore acreage and subdued drilling activity. Unless the government can intervene to revive operator confidence, the near future also does not look encouraging for drilling demand.

OIMT201608

Global excess oil supply still looks likely to average 0.5m bpd in 2016 – sufficient, it would seem, to stop oil prices rising much above $50/bbl and therefore to forestall a recovery in E&P activity and the offshore markets. On the supply side of the equation, US shale production and Saudi policy tend to be seen as the key “swing factors”. However, an appreciable degree of relief could also come from elsewhere.

Taking A Swing At Production

West Africa, a fairly mature oil producing region, accounted for 6% (5.3m bpd) of global oil supply in 2015, including 17% (4.4m bpd) of world offshore oil production. To put this in context, world oil oversupply in 2015 stood at around 1.7m bpd – 2% of total supply, i.e. 95.8m bpd, to which the US contributed 12.6m bpd (13%) and Saudi Arabia 12.4m bpd (13%). Saudi Arabian production so far in 2016 has been stable, while US shale oil production in May 2016 was down just 8.9% on May 2015, representing a far slower decline than many observers anticipated. It follows, then, that a severe disruption to West African oil production could have significant implications for the global oil supply-demand balance. Such a scenario seems to be unfolding in Nigeria, which in 2015 produced an estimated 2.3m bpd – 43% of West African oil production. In a series of high-profile attacks, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA, a new permutation of the old militant group MEND) have sabotaged pipes and wells in the Niger Delta, crippling onshore and shallow water output. At the same time, only 12,000 bpd of offshore capacity (from the Antan field) is set to start up in 2016, and even fixed platforms further from shore, like “Okan NWP PRP”, have come under attack. As a result, Nigerian oil production reportedly fell to 1.1m bpd in May, and 2016 production is projected to average 1.8m bpd – a production loss equivalent to 28% of oversupply in 2015.

In Full Swing No Longer

Political risk is thus one reason West Africa can be a “swing factor” in oil production; another is project economics, especially over the medium term. Angola, for instance, accounts for 43% of West African offshore oil production and 33% of projects in the region yet to reach EPC. However, most of these are deepwater FPSO hubs with high breakevens. In fact, the last project sanctioned off Angola was the $16bn Kaombo Ph.1 project in April 2014, with a reported breakeven of $74/bbl. Given the dearth of project FIDs since 2014, a paucity of start-ups is expected in 2018-21, which would feed into weaker world oil supply growth.

The Swinging Sixties

In the long term though, West Africa has the potential to act as a swing region for (offshore) oil production in the opposite direction. Given stronger oil prices, c.$60-$80/bbl, prolific projects such as Chissonga (Angola, 150,000 bpd) could be feasible again, while an oil price of c.$90/bbl would unlock the potential of many of the 39 Equatorial Margin frontier fields discovered offshore since 2010. West Africa could thus, in a favourable price environment, make an important contribution to world oil supply growth once again.

Of course, political risk and costly projects make West Africa a challenging region at present. But taking a macro view, that could actually be positive for oil prices. West Africa is clearly one among a range of important swing factors in the world oil supply-demand balance.

OIMT201606

Over the course of the last 20 years, oil and gas companies have cultivated a vast metallic forest beneath the world’s oceans, consisting now of some 5,800 installed subsea trees. The growth of this artificial arboretum has supported an array of related offshore fabrication, installation and IMR industries. But how to assess the outlook for this complex sector? Well, one key metric is the subsea tree backlog…

Into The Woods

The tree ‘backlog’ is the ‘orderbook’ of subsea trees. It is constituted by trees ordered by oil companies from subsea fabricators that have not yet been installed. A tree itself is the tall array of valves that caps a well; unlike ‘dry’ trees, subsea or ‘wet’ trees are located on the seabed, rather than on fixed platforms or MOPUs. While fields can host various subsea structure types, trees are at the core of nearly all subsea developments. Hence, the backlog is a key proxy for subsea CAPEX and subsea construction vessel demand. The real boom for the subsea sector came in period of high oil prices after 2009, as innovation in the subsea sector facilitated deepwater frontier projects in West Africa, Brazil and the US GoM. The backlog grew from 647 units in Q3 2009 to a peak of 1,158 at start Q4 2014 – an increase of 79%. At this point a number of large projects utilising subsea trees had recently reached the EPC stage, including TEN (Ghana, $4.9bn, 36 trees), Egina (Nigeria, $15bn, 44 trees) and Buzios (Brazil, $2.6bn, 20 trees). The charter rate for a large (250t crane) MSV in the North Sea, meanwhile, stood at around $52-59,000/day.

Cut Down To Size

However, like other offshore sectors, the subsea sector has been adversely affected by weaker oil prices (and the paralysis at Petrobras). Initially the backlog provided a degree of insulation for fabricators and installation contractors. The backlog is eroding though, having fallen y-o-y in each of the last nine quarters by between 1% and 14%. As at start Q2 2016, it stood at 876 units, down 24% on the Q4 2013 peak. Installers have been working through the backlog while new awards have dwindled (only 59 trees have been contracted in 2016 as at start May) due to a dearth of project FIDs. True, the subsea sector has held up better than the rig or OSV sectors (in part due to IMR demand, not captured by the backlog size) but North Sea dayrates for a 250t MSV have fallen by 34% since Q2 2014, to $32-43,000/day at start May 2016.


New Spring?

Could things in subsea get as challenging as in the rig and OSV sectors? Perhaps, but that depends on the timing of the recovery in offshore project FIDs. Besides, the downturn is not all bad for subsea – in the long run. In order to reduce field development costs, companies are increasingly relying on subsea efficiency gains – Statoil’s subsea standardisation drive is a notable example of this. As costs at subsea projects fall, more such projects are likely to receive FIDs. New tree awards are expected to recover to around 300 per annum by the end of the decade.

So subsea seems to be becoming more challenged, as reflected in the falling subsea tree backlog. But subsea is likely to play a key part in the recovery too. The arrival of new awards, followed by a sustained increase in backlog, will be a good indicator of when the offshore market is out of the woods.

OIMT201605

As the many Greek players in the shipping industry know well, the legend of Icarus tells us the dangers of flying too high. Merchant vessel earnings eventually found their 2008 heights just as unsustainable, even as some talked of a “new paradigm”. Most will be familiar with the lengthy downturn that has followed. But spare a thought for the offshore markets, now going through their own Icarus moment.

Flying On The Dragon’s Back

As with the expectations of some in the shipping industry that Chinese demand for raw materials would grow indefinitely, the consensus over the 2010-13 period was that oil prices were set to remain above $100/bbl. Oil demand growth seemed firm and supply growth scarce as decline in output from ageing onshore fields undermined growth from new deepwater offshore regions. The offshore sector attracted interest from shipyards in both Korea and China, and amongst traditional shipowners (including some Greek players).

The precipitous fall from grace of the main shipping markets in late 2008 seemed to presage a tough and lengthy downturn. As the graph shows, the ClarkSea Index (an indicator of merchant sector vessel earnings) fell by more than 80% in a matter of weeks, and offshore support vessel (OSV) and rig dayrate indices fell by 50%. Yet, by late 2009, the oil price had bounced back, and offshore units seemed like attractive investment opportunities for diversification away from over-supplied shipping sectors.

On The Right Path?

For some years, offshore investors seemed to have taken the correct turning, as dayrates for rigs and OSVs soared, and by 2013 were close to the heights reached prior to the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the ClarkSea Index remained earthbound, with earnings hampered by a sluggish world economy and phases of newbuilding activity, as government stimulus and low newbuilding prices combined to boost counter-cyclical orders.

For Icarus, the heat of the sun proved to be his undoing. In the case of the offshore markets, the heights they reached were dashed by an unexpected underground source of oil and gas. Few saw coming the game-changing effect that technological change would have on the oil supply-demand balance. Fracking produced 3.8m bpd of additional onshore oil supply from US shale by 2015.

Initially, the effect of this extra supply was hidden, by outages due to political instability in areas such as Libya, Russia, and Iraq. But as oversupply of about 2m bpd became clearer, Saudi Arabia refused to resolve the problem through a unilateral oil output cut.

Down To Earth

Today the offshore markets look to be in an equally or even more challenged position than the major shipping segments. Dayrates for both rigs and OSVs have fallen by 40-50% over the course of the last eighteen months. There is currently little positive sentiment, and many assume that the near future for these offshore sectors could come to resemble the ClarkSea Index’s recent past. But cyclicality, after all, has been a part of these industries for decades. As the best Greek asset players will tell you, the key is to ride a market upturn, but to get out before you get too close to the sun.

SIW1219

As a result of weaker oil prices and E&P spending cuts, offshore exploration is severely challenged. This is reflected in the fact that discoveries are down 47% y-o-y on an annualised basis so far in 2016, global rig utilisation has dropped 22 percentage points to 73% in two years, and 29% of seismic units are inactive. But it is also reflected in a perhaps less prominent element of exploration, namely, block awards.

Block Basics

The basic framework for offshore exploration is provided by blocks. Blocks are areas in which specific oil companies (the licensees) have set E&P rights and obligations with respect to one another and the host country over a specified period. As at April 2016, oil companies hold 10,968 offshore blocks (with an average area of 996 km2) globally. As a general rule, each block will have an operator company, but also several more companies with equity in the block. This allows oil companies to spread the risks of E&P.

Blocks may be awarded to oil companies on a one-off basis but are usually awarded through well-publicised, semi-regular licensing rounds, for example Norway’s ongoing ‘23rd Licensing Round’. Indeed, at present eight offshore rounds are in progress, covering 55 blocks. However, oil company uptake is looking lacklustre and it is expected that, given low levels of interest, a very small percentage of these will be awarded. Just 102 offshore blocks have been awarded so far in 2016, down 38% y-o-y on an annualised basis on a poor 2015. By way of comparison, 1,162 offshore blocks were awarded in 2013.

Acreage Accumulation

In part, this situation reflects reduced E&P spending (exploration budgets are relatively easy to cut). But it also reflects something of a block ‘asset bubble’ in the 2010 to 2014 period, in which 5.99 million km2 of offshore acreage was awarded. Supported by a high and stable oil price, many oil companies stocked up on frontier acreage, engaging in bidding wars for key blocks, driving up prices. For example, in a battle for a 8.5% share in Area 1 off Mozambique in 2012, the block was implicitly valued at c.$14 billion (and East Africa was just one of several frontiers opened up in this period). Oil companies thus acquired a great deal of relatively costly offshore acreage in a short period.

Exploration Excesses

On the plus side, the exploration boom of 2010 to 2014 yielded 765 offshore discoveries, including many large finds that are likely to drive future offshore production growth. However, block oversupply, analogous to that in segments of the offshore fleet, built up. As the two graphs show, the peak of the latest block awards cycle coincided with a 2013 peak in ordering of rigs (117 units) and seismic capacity (104 streamers). Just as there is a supply-demand imbalance in the seismic and rig markets, so too is there in blocks. Oil companies are now sitting on a backlog of unexplored blocks, with fewer incentives to bid for new acreage (though strategic investment in Iran or deepwater Mexico might still happen).

So licensing reflects the broader exploration situation, with block awards and vessel contracting showing similar trends. This being the case, a future rise in block awards could perhaps presage a general recovery in exploration. In gauging exploration sentiment then, upcoming licensing rounds could well be worth monitoring.

OIMT201604

The rise of deepwater E&P constituted a boon for the offshore fleet, helping to drive, for example, 180% and 60% increases in the FPSO and floater fleets from 2000 to 2015. However, deepwater development has lagged exploration, and so the offshore sector is fairly exposed to projects with high breakevens – problematic, given the oil price. But could the downturn actually help deepwater E&P in the long term?

Deepwater Exploration

The first deepwater offshore discovery was not made until 1976, by which point 1,018 shallow water fields had been discovered and 350 brought onstream, and it was only in the late-1990s that deepwater E&P really took off. Oil companies began pushing deeper into the US GoM, while the internationalization of the industry in the 2000s saw a spate of deepwater discoveries off West Africa and Brazil. A robust and rising oil price helped sustain rising deepwater E&P until 2015, with India, Australia and East Africa becoming important frontiers too. The average water depth of global offshore field discoveries passed 200m for the first time in 1996, 500m in 2004 and 800m in 2012, and the number of deepwater discoveries averaged 55 per year from 2005 to 2015.

Deepwater Production

However, as the main graph shows, the mean water depth of discoveries rose much faster than did that of start-ups: the former stood at 734m in 2015, the latter at 377m. Indeed, by 2016, out of a total of 998 deepwater finds, just 27% had started up, with deepwater start-ups averaging 19 per year from 2005 to 2015. The divergence was in large part because technological barriers and cost overheads in deepwater production – subsea, SURF and MOPU – are more complex and expensive than in exploration, and efficiency gains seem to have been more limited to date as well. Deepwater project sanctioning was therefore relatively inhibited, and due to limited sanctioning, the backlog of undeveloped deepwater fields grew at a faster rate than that of shallow water fields, as indicated by the inset graph. Thus over time, the overall backlog of potential projects has become more costly and complex. Indeed, some reports suggest oil project average breakevens have risen by c.270% since 2003.

Deepwater Challenges

This is partly why the offshore outlook is challenged at present: deepwater fields have relatively high breakevens (usually $60-$90/bbl) yet also form a major part of oil companies’ portfolios. Some major oil companies have indicated that 2016 E&P spending cuts are to bite deeper off than onshore, where costs are lower (even for shale, in many cases). In January 2016, Chevron decided to axe outright Buckskin, a US GoM project in a water depth of 1,816m with a breakeven of c.$72/bbl. ConocoPhilips, meanwhile, is planning to exit deepwater altogether.

However, in order to make deepwater viable again, many companies are trying instead to cut project costs. Statoil, for example, has reduced the CAPEX of Johan Castberg by 48% and the breakeven by 40%. Some cost savings (in day rates, for instance) are likely to be cyclical; others, such as in subsea fabrication, yielding improved deepwater project economics, are likely to be more lasting. So while exposure to deepwater projects is clearly a challenge given the current oil price, cost cutting now could be to the benefit of deepwater E&P in the long run.

OIMT201602