Archives for posts with tag: offshore sector

Shallow water field developments can often be overshadowed by complex deepwater projects involving MOPUs and subsea trees. Yet shallow water, fixed platform developments remain a key part of the offshore sector and a significant source of vessel demand in many areas. And with some notable fixed platform project FIDs coming up, a review of this sometimes neglected segment seems timely.

For the full version of this article, please go to Offshore Intelligence Network.

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After three consecutive years of falling offshore project CAPEX, things were a little more positive on the project sanctioning front in 2017, with major developments such as Coral FLNG Ph.1 receiving FIDs and total global offshore project CAPEX rising by 44% y-o-y. Sanctioning sentiment is still well below pre-downturn levels, but the relative positivity seems to be holding, so what might be on the cards for 2018?

For the full version of this article, please go to Offshore Intelligence Network.

In the broader context of firm global LNG demand growth, Australian offshore gas mega-projects have been a significant feature of the offshore sector for the last decade, driving innovation (think Prelude FLNG) and yielding rapid production growth. There are also a few projects projected to push output even higher in the short term, though against this backdrop, there are some uncertainties in the longer term.

For the full version of this article, please go to Offshore Intelligence Network.

After an extremely challenging 2016, parts of the offshore sector had a less harrowing year in 2017. Oil prices, though volatile, trended upwards, offshore project sanctioning picked up and there was a sense that perhaps some charter markets were starting to bottom out. That being said, it was still another very challenging year for the offshore fleet and owners will certainly be looking for improvements in 2018.

For the full version of this article, please go to Offshore Intelligence Network.

The shipping markets have in the main been pretty icy since the onset of the global economic downturn back in 2008, but 2016 has seen a particular blast of cold air rattle through the shipping industry, with few sectors escaping the frosty grasp of the downturn. Asset investment equally appears to have been frozen close to stasis. So, can we measure how cold things have really been?

Lack Of Heat

Generally, our ClarkSea Index provides a helpful way to take the temperature of industry earnings, measuring the performance of the key ‘volume’ market sectors (tankers, bulkers, boxships and gas carriers). Since the start of Q4 2008 it has averaged $11,948/day, compared to $23,666/day between the start of 2000 and the end of Q3 2008. However, earnings aren’t the only thing that can provide ‘heat’ in shipping. Investor appetite for vessel acquisition has often added ‘heat’ to the market in the form of investment in newbuild or secondhand tonnage, even when, as in 2013, earnings remained challenged. To examine this, we once again revisit the quarterly ‘Shipping Heat Index’, which reflects not only vessel earnings but also investment activity, to see how iced up 2016 has really been.

Fresh Heat?

This year, we’ve tweaked the index a little, to include historical newbuild and secondhand asset investment in terms of value, rather than just the pure number of units. This helps us better put the level of ‘Shipping Heat’ in context. In these terms, shipping appears to be as cold (if not more so) as back in early 2009. This year the ‘Heat Index’ has averaged 36, standing at 34 in Q4 2016, which compares to a four-quarter average of 43 between Q4 2008 and Q3 2009.

Feeling The Chill

Partly, of course, this reflects the earnings environment. The ClarkSea Index has averaged $9,329/day in the year to date and is on track for the lowest annual average in 30 years. In August 2016, the index hit $7,073/day, with the major shipping markets all under severe pressure.

All Iced Up

The investment side has seen the temperature drop even further. Newbuilding contracts have numbered just 419 in the first eleven months of 2016, heading for the lowest annual total in over 30 years, and newbuild investment value has totalled just $30.9bn. Weak volume sector markets, as well as a frozen stiff offshore sector, have by far outweighed positivity in some of the niche sectors (50% of the value of newbuild investment this year has been in cruise ships). S&P volumes have been fairly steady, but the reported aggregate value is down at $11.2bn. All this has led to the ‘Shipping Heat Index’ dropping down below its 2009 low-point.

Baby It’s Cold Outside

So, in today’s challenging markets the heat is once again absent from shipping. And, in fact, on taking the temperature, things are just as icy as they were back in 2008-09 when the cold winds of recession blew in. This year has shown that after years out in the cold, it’s pretty hard for things not to get frozen up. Let’s hope for some warmer conditions in 2017.

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Two high-level indicators of vessel and structure demand in the offshore sector are energy prices and oil company E&P spending. A third, slightly more specific indicator is estimated offshore project capital expenditure, or CAPEX. While this metric does not capture demand arising from, for example, offshore exploration campaigns, it can be a key proxy for demand resulting from offshore EPC activity.

CAPEX Defined

Since the start of 2010, around $980bn of CAPEX has been committed to some 669 offshore projects globally. But just what makes up offshore project CAPEX? As defined herein, it consists of estimated capital invested in the development, redevelopment or decommissioning of offshore fields; it excludes spending on licensing rounds, seismic surveys and exploration wells, as well as operational expenditure arising from manning and IMR at active fields. CAPEX is committed via EPC contracts, usually issued soon after a project final investment decision (FID), for items such as MOPUs, fixed platforms, pipelines and subsea trees, as well as support, installation and development drilling services. CAPEX also translates into field developments that create durable demand for OSVs. CAPEX data collected by Clarksons Research is as specified by project operators; where no definitive figure is given, estimates are derived from assessment of comparable projects with known CAPEX.

Measuring CAPEX

One advantage of CAPEX as a metric is that, unlike a count of project FIDs, it reflects the differing ‘weight’ of projects. Indeed, project CAPEX can vary by several orders of magnitude. The B-173A Expansion project off India, for example, entailed the installation of a second shallow water fixed platform on the B-173A gas field. The project, which started up in 2015, had a reported price tag of $67m. In contrast, the ongoing 230,000 bpd Kaombo Ph.1 development off Angola has a reported CAPEX of $16bn. This wide variation in costs helps to explain recent CAPEX trends. During the 2011 to 2013 boom years, estimated CAPEX averaged $204bn p.a. globally, supported by high energy prices and rising E&P budgets. As oil prices tumbled in 2014, CAPEX fell by 54% y-o-y. CAPEX in 2015 was steady on 2014, even though FIDs fell by 41%, as a few giant projects with low breakevens, such as Johan Sverdrup (Norway, $12bn) and WND Ph.1 (Egypt, $12bn), received FIDs. However, other FIDs have continued to slip in the downturn. CAPEX so far in 2016 stands at around $40bn, down 34% y-o-y on an annualised basis.

CAPEX As An Indicator

As offshore CAPEX has fallen, EPC tendering has suffered, and hence, for example, MOPU newbuild contracting has dropped from an average of 18 units p.a. in 2010 to 2013, to just eight units in 2015 and two in 2016 to date. Similarly, 16 pipelayers were contracted in the same period, but only one unit has been ordered since 2013, reflecting depressed utilisation and earnings. Until CAPEX begins to increase once more, these sectors are likely to remain challenged.

In terms of spotting a recovery, then, it is worth keeping an eye on oil companies’ offshore project CAPEX plans. For not only is CAPEX one of a range of factors affecting offshore markets; it is a useful indicator with particular relevance to EPC-led vessel activity and investment too.

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The rise of deepwater E&P constituted a boon for the offshore fleet, helping to drive, for example, 180% and 60% increases in the FPSO and floater fleets from 2000 to 2015. However, deepwater development has lagged exploration, and so the offshore sector is fairly exposed to projects with high breakevens – problematic, given the oil price. But could the downturn actually help deepwater E&P in the long term?

Deepwater Exploration

The first deepwater offshore discovery was not made until 1976, by which point 1,018 shallow water fields had been discovered and 350 brought onstream, and it was only in the late-1990s that deepwater E&P really took off. Oil companies began pushing deeper into the US GoM, while the internationalization of the industry in the 2000s saw a spate of deepwater discoveries off West Africa and Brazil. A robust and rising oil price helped sustain rising deepwater E&P until 2015, with India, Australia and East Africa becoming important frontiers too. The average water depth of global offshore field discoveries passed 200m for the first time in 1996, 500m in 2004 and 800m in 2012, and the number of deepwater discoveries averaged 55 per year from 2005 to 2015.

Deepwater Production

However, as the main graph shows, the mean water depth of discoveries rose much faster than did that of start-ups: the former stood at 734m in 2015, the latter at 377m. Indeed, by 2016, out of a total of 998 deepwater finds, just 27% had started up, with deepwater start-ups averaging 19 per year from 2005 to 2015. The divergence was in large part because technological barriers and cost overheads in deepwater production – subsea, SURF and MOPU – are more complex and expensive than in exploration, and efficiency gains seem to have been more limited to date as well. Deepwater project sanctioning was therefore relatively inhibited, and due to limited sanctioning, the backlog of undeveloped deepwater fields grew at a faster rate than that of shallow water fields, as indicated by the inset graph. Thus over time, the overall backlog of potential projects has become more costly and complex. Indeed, some reports suggest oil project average breakevens have risen by c.270% since 2003.

Deepwater Challenges

This is partly why the offshore outlook is challenged at present: deepwater fields have relatively high breakevens (usually $60-$90/bbl) yet also form a major part of oil companies’ portfolios. Some major oil companies have indicated that 2016 E&P spending cuts are to bite deeper off than onshore, where costs are lower (even for shale, in many cases). In January 2016, Chevron decided to axe outright Buckskin, a US GoM project in a water depth of 1,816m with a breakeven of c.$72/bbl. ConocoPhilips, meanwhile, is planning to exit deepwater altogether.

However, in order to make deepwater viable again, many companies are trying instead to cut project costs. Statoil, for example, has reduced the CAPEX of Johan Castberg by 48% and the breakeven by 40%. Some cost savings (in day rates, for instance) are likely to be cyclical; others, such as in subsea fabrication, yielding improved deepwater project economics, are likely to be more lasting. So while exposure to deepwater projects is clearly a challenge given the current oil price, cost cutting now could be to the benefit of deepwater E&P in the long run.

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