Archives for posts with tag: Fleet Development

With the ClarkSea Index around $9,000/day, and many if not most of the major shipping markets under severe pressure, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that the shipping markets are a tough place right now, with limited pickings to share between owners. However, everything’s relative, and from one angle the size of the ‘pie’ might just be bigger than it seems…

How Big’s The Pie?

Last week the ClarkSea Index stood at $8,743/day, and during 2016 as a whole the index averaged $9,441/day, taking into account earnings in the tanker, bulkcarrier, gas carrier and containership sectors, across a selection of over 21,000 units at the start of the year. Estimating the aggregate annual earnings for the basket of vessels in question, that works out at $72.5 billion in full year 2016. To put this in context against the boom years of the 2000s, in 2007 the ClarkSea Index averaged $33,061/day across a basket of over 15,000 ships, generating aggregate earnings of $189.1bn, over two and half times more than in 2016.

In terms of average earnings levels, 2016 actually compares more equally to 1992, 25 years ago, when the ClarkSea Index averaged $9,786/day, or 1999 when it averaged $9,855/day. But of course the fleet has grown since those days and, in dwt terms, the basket of ships in the index in 2016 was 159% bigger than in 1999 and 219% larger than in 1992. Aggregate earnings in 1999 reached $43.6bn and in 1992 were $36.1bn. 2016’s total was 66% and 101% larger respectively. In today’s challenging markets it is food for thought that the earnings stream is still that much bigger than at similar earnings levels in the past.

A Bigger Bake

And furthermore, there’s a wider world of shipping outside the scope of the ClarkSea Index basket which is (hopefully) generating income too. If, for instance, the 2016 earnings of the ClarkSea Index basket were extrapolated on a $/dwt basis (it stood at $48/dwt) across the whole of the 1.7bn dwt world cargo fleet, the overall earnings of that wider fleet would have come to $85bn. That’s roughly the size of the economy of Ukraine!

Rising Cost Of Ingredients

However, having said all this, it’s not just about earnings. Costs need to be taken into account too. Using a weighted index of OPEX across the ClarkSea Index basket and subtracting it from aggregate earnings would imply an overall net cash flow in of $23.4bn in 2016 (this compares to around $150bn in 2007 and 2008). Helpfully, in recent decades fleet expansion has outweighed growth in OPEX so the net cash flow pie has grown compared to previous downturns too.

A Slice Of The Action

So, whilst market conditions are as challenging as any seen in the last few decades, the revenue ‘pie’, though hardly tasty yet, is at least significantly larger than it was last time that earnings were at a similar level. For the industry that means a larger pie to be shared around. In today’s difficult markets that could be helpful, but of course you have to get a big enough slice. Have a nice day.


There have been plenty of record breaking facts and figures to report across 2016, unfortunately mostly of a gloomy nature! From a record low for the Baltic Dry Index in February to a post-1990 low for the ClarkSea Index in August, there have certainly been plenty of challenges. That hasn’t stopped investors however (S&P not newbuilds) so let’s hope for less record breakers (except demolition!?) in 2017.SIW1254

Unwelcome Records….

Our first record to report came in August when the ClarkSea Index hit a post-1990 low of $7,073/day. Its average for the year was $9,441/day, down 35% y-o-y and also beating the previous cyclical lows in 2010 and 1999. With OPEX for the same basket of ships at $6,394/day, margins were thin or non-existent.

Challenges Abound….

Across sectors, average tanker earnings for the year were “OK” but still wound down by 40%, albeit from an excellent 2015. Despite a good start and end to the year, the wet markets were hit hard by a weak summer when production outages impacted. The early part of the year also brought us another unwelcome milestone: the Baltic Dry Index falling to an all time low of 291. Heavy demolition in the first half and better than expected Chinese trade helped later in the year – fundamentals may be starting to turn but perhaps taking time to play out with bumps on the way. The container market (see next week) had another tough year, including its first major corporate casualty for 30 years in Hanjin. LPG had a “hard” landing after a stellar 2015, LNG showed small improvements and specialised products started to ease back. As reported in our mid-year review, every “dog has its day” and in 2016, this was Ro-Ro and Ferry, with earnings 50% above the trend since 2009. Also spare a thought for the offshore sector, arguably facing an even more extreme scenario than shipping.

Buy, Buy, Buy….

In our review of 2015, we speculated that buyers might be “eyeing up a bottoming out dry cycle” in 2016 and a 24% increase in bulker tonnage bought and sold suggests a lot of owners agreed. Indeed, 44m dwt represents another all time record for bulker S&P, with prices increasing marginally after the first quarter and brokers regularly reporting numerous parties willing to inspect vessels coming for sale. Tanker investors were much more circumspect and volumes and prices both fell by a third. Greeks again topped the buyer charts, followed by the Chinese. Demo eased in 2H but (incl. containers) total volumes were up 14% (44m dwt).

Order Drought….

Depending on your perspective, an overall 71% drop in ordering (total orders also hit a 35 year record low) is either cause for optimism or for further gloom! In fact, only 113 yards took orders (for vessels 1,000+ GT) in the year, compared to 345 in 2013, with tanker orders down 83% and bulkers down 46%. There was little ordering in any sector, except Cruise (a record 2.5m GT and $15.6bn), Ferry and Ro-Ro (all niche business however and of little help to volume yards).

Final Record….

Finally a couple more records – global fleet growth of 3% to 1.8bn dwt (up 50% since the financial crisis with tankers at 555m dwt and bulkers at 794m dwt) and trade growth of 2.6% to 11.1bn tonnes (up 3bn tonnes since the financial crisis) mean we still finish with the largest fleet and trade volumes of all time! Plenty of challenges again in 2017 but let’s hope we aren’t reporting as many gloomy records next year.
Have a nice New Year!

In the shipping world, ‘Santa’s Sleigh’ is the big containership fleet, which carries the goods from manufacturers in Asia to the retailers in Europe and North America in good time for consumers to prepare for the holiday season. How full the ‘sleigh’ appears to be each year gives an interesting indication of the health of the containerised freight sector.

A Tricky Sleigh Ride

Broadly, the containership sector has generated a huge potential surplus of capacity since the global financial crisis. By the end of 2016, despite the recent surge in demolition activity, 9.1 million TEU of capacity will have been added to the fleet since the end of 2008, equal to growth of 84%. During the same period box trade has grown by around 34%. For those who deliver the world’s consumer goods, this has required a huge balancing act, managing surplus supply through slower speeds, and idling of capacity. The difficulty of this has created huge volatility in freight rate levels. Meanwhile, from early 2014 freight rates seemed to have been moving sharply downhill. Goods for the holiday season are usually moved to retailers with plenty of time to spare in the peak shipping season from May to October, but nonetheless overall movements in mainlane trade and capacity deployed (see graph description) give us a good idea of how full ‘Santa’s Sleigh’ might have been.

Last Christmas

Following the acute drop in freight rates in 2014, things were looking tricky for the bearers of gifts by the end of 2015. Spurred by ‘mega-ship’ deliveries and 8% growth in the boxship fleet, mainlane running capacity grew by 5% in 2015. But trade had hit the buffers. Although there was annual peak leg volume growth of 6% on the Transpacific, peak leg Far East-Europe volumes slumped by 3% on the back of a sluggish Europe, collapsing Russian volumes and destocking by retailers (perhaps not enough folk had been well-behaved enough for Santa to pay a visit?). At one point Far East-Europe spot freight rates hit $205/TEU, catastrophically low levels for the liner companies.

Wonderful Christmastime?

But things have eventually started to look a tiny bit brighter. Disciplined capacity management (cascading and idling) allied to slower deliveries has seen mainlane capacity drop 3% this year, whilst peak leg mainlane volumes look set to be up 2% with Far East-Europe growth back in positive territory. With the collapse of Hanjin, there’s one less sleigh driver, potentially allowing others to fill up more. Mainlane freight looks like it might have bottomed out; Asia-USWC spot rates jumped from an average of $1,459/FEU in Q3 2016 to $1,732/FEU in Q4 to date.

The Best Kind Of Present

How do things look for ‘Santa’s Sleigh’ in 2017? Well, with more capacity to come, any gains will be very hard won (and for the charter owners there’s still plenty of capacity idle). But it looks like there should be further cargo growth, so the challenge for Santa will once again be to maintain an appropriate amount of space for all the gifts. If he does that, the sleigh might feel fuller next year. That would be a nice present for the liner industry.


Today’s Shipping Intelligence Weekly comes on the 896th anniversary of what was, back then, one of the most catastrophic losses to hit shipping for many years. On November 25th 1120, the sinking of the so-called White Ship off the French port of Barfleur killed the heir to the English throne and prompted a civil war between the forces of Matilda and Stephen. Fortunately, ships are safer today!

White Ship On The White List?

According to the historical record, the White Ship had been “recently-refitted”, although it seems unlikely that standards in the yards would have been on a par with the present system of special surveys. Today, the industry has an interlocking network of regulatory bodies dedicated to preventing casualties and losses. These include flag states, class societies, port state control bodies and others.

The loss of Prince William Adelin’s White Ship was blamed at the time on “excessive drunkenness and overcrowding” amongst the crew: not something that would be tolerated by today’s port authorities. Back to the 21st century, the Graph of the Week shows the number of total losses recorded by Clarksons Research by ship type. Over the long term, the trend is downward: 153 losses were registered in 1996, but only 51 have been recorded so far for 2015 (ships 100+ GT).

It is possible that a more systematic approach to safety and environmental monitoring has helped to ensure that only well-maintained ships put to sea. In 1996, the MoUs collectively performed just over 30,000 inspections, 9.6% of which resulted in a detention. By 2015, the number of inspections had risen to more than 80,000. But detention levels have consistently declined, to 3.5% of vessels inspected in 2015. The most likely explanation for this is that fewer vessels with deficiencies serious enough to warrant detention are being encountered.

The reduced trend in losses has been particularly marked since 2009, driven by fewer losses of small general cargo vessels. 1,817 general cargo vessels have been scrapped since the start of 2009. This has removed elderly breakbulk tonnage (which hung on in the boom) from the market, possibly reducing losses.

A Big Loss

Of course, although losses have become less frequent in numerical terms, a persistent fear for the industry is a high profile casualty (as the White Ship was). Analogous modern-day examples might include the Costa Concordia ($1.2bn salvage cost) or Rena ($0.7bn). The ability of salvage operators, hull & machinery insurers or P&I clubs to handle a larger loss of an ultra-large containership or cruise ship has been much debated.

Accidents Happen…

The grounding of the rig Transocean Winner off Scotland in August shows that even in the modern maritime world of the 21st century, vessels still get into difficulties. Fortunately, this was not a disaster: minimal oil was spilled, and the drilling unit was speedily salvaged. The indicators on the graph suggest that the industry may be becoming safer. In numerical terms, only 0.05% of the world fleet 100+ GT was lost in 2015, down from 0.26% back in 1996. These are positive signs, but, as much of the English government discovered aboard the White Ship, the sea always needs treating with respect. Have a nice day.


As in many sectors of economic activity, provision of just the right amount of capacity is a tricky business, and the shipbuilding industry is no exception. As a result, in stronger markets the ‘lead time’ between ordering and delivery extends and owners can face a substantial wait to get their hands on newbuild tonnage, whilst in weaker markets the ‘lead time’ drops with yard space more readily available.

What’s The Lead?

So shipyard ‘lead time’ can be a useful indicator, but how best to measure it? One way is to examine the data and take the average time to the original scheduled delivery of contracts placed each month. The graph shows the 6-month moving average (6mma) of this over 20 years. When lead time ‘lengthens’, it reflects the fact that shipyards are relatively busy, with capacity well-utilised, and have the ability, and confidence, to take orders with delivery scheduled a number of years ahead. For shipowners longer lead times reflect a greater degree of faith in market conditions, supporting transactions which will not see assets delivered for some years hence. Longer lead times generally build up in stronger markets. Just when owners want ships to capitalise on market conditions, they can’t get them so easily. But lead times shrink when markets are weak; just when owners don’t want tonnage, conversely it’s easier to get. The graph comparing the lead time indicator and the ClarkSea Index illustrates this correlation perfectly.

Stretching The Lead

Never was this clearer than in the boom of the 2000s. Demand for newbuilds increased robustly as markets boomed. The ClarkSea Index surged to $40,000/day and yards became more greatly utilised even with the addition of new shipbuilding capacity, most notably in China. The 6mma of contract lead time jumped by 49% from 23 months to 35 months between start 2002 and start 2005. By the peak of the boom, owners were facing record average lead times of more than 40 months. In reality, as ‘slippage’ ensued, many units took even longer to actually deliver than originally scheduled.

Shrinking Lead

The market slumped after the onset of the financial crisis, with the ClarkSea Index averaging below $12,000/day in this decade so far. Lead times have dropped sharply, with yards today left with an eroding future book. The monthly lead time metric has averaged 26 months in the 2010s, despite support from ‘long-lead’ orders (such as cruise ships) and reductions in yard capacity. Of course, volatility in lead time recently reflects much more limited ordering volumes.

Taking A New Lead

So, ‘lead times’ are another good indicator of the health of the markets, expanding and contracting to reflect the balance of the demand for and supply of shipyard capacity. They also tell us much about the potential health of the shipbuilding industry. In addition, even if shorter lead times indicate the potential to access fresh tonnage more promptly, unless demand shifts significantly or yards can price to attract further capacity take-up quickly, they might just herald an oncoming slowdown in supply growth. At least that might be one positive ‘lead’ from this investigation. Have a nice day.


As snooker players know, it’s hard to keep a good break going. In today’s conditions, the shipping industry needs supply-side re-positioning to help the markets back to improved health, and increased recycling in recent years has been a clear part of this. However, there’s still some way to go to better times, so it’s worth taking a look at how today’s ‘big break’ might leave the future potential scrapping profile.

The Big Break!

Since the start of 2009, a total of 206.6m GT of shipping capacity has been sold for recycling, compared to an aggregate of 63.1m GT in the previous seven years. This total includes 94.7m GT of bulkcarrier tonnage and 29.1m GT of containerships, helping to address oversupply in the volume shipping markets. But given such a prolific run of demolition activity, what does the future potential scrapping profile look like? Well, there are many measures that can be used to investigate this, including the metric featured in the graph. If the average age of scrapping is taken as a useful indicator of the current state of conditions facing owners in each market, then calculating the amount of tonnage remaining in the fleet at today’s average age of scrapping or higher might tell us something interesting, especially if ongoing market conditions persist.

What’s Left On The Table?

In the tanker sector, which up until fairly recently was backed by stronger market conditions, the average age of scrapping in the year to date remains relatively high, at 25 years for crude tankers and 27 for product tankers (bear in mind that not many tankers have been sold for scrap recently, and the average age may fall). Given that a lot of older single hulled tanker tonnage was phased out in the 2000s, the amount of tonnage above the average age today is limited. In the bulker and containership sectors, both under severe market pressure for some time now, the statistics are a little more revealing. Despite heavy recycling in recent times, the share of tonnage above the current average age of scrapping is 8% for Capesizes and 6% for Panamaxes. For boxships sub-3,000 TEU the figure is 10% and for those 3-6,000 TEU 12%. Of course if the average age of scrapping falls, then the picture changes again. In the 3-6,000 TEU boxship sector, the youngest ship sold for scrap this year was just 10 years old; around 50% of tonnage today is that age or older.

Cue More Demo?

What does this tell us overall? Well, using the sector breakdown shown in the graph, the statistics tell us that around 75m GT in the fleet is above the current average age of scrapping, 6% of the world fleet. At 2016’s rate of demolition, that’s another 2.4 years’ worth. And given the age profile of the world fleet, after another 2 years an additional 21m GT will have crossed the current average age mark and after 5 years another 77m GT.

Break Not Over?

So, what chance does the industry have of keeping the demolition pressure on? Well, obviously freight and scrap market conditions and regulatory influences will have a big say. However, it looks like, in today’s terms at least, the industry might be in a good position to keep the break going. Have a nice day.

SIW1242 Graph of the Week

Back in the past the gas shipping sectors may have been considered relatively niche within the world of global shipping. However, in the last two decades they have been amongst the faster growing parts of the industry. This week’s Analysis takes a look at how shipping’s ‘coolest’ sector has grown in prominence to become part of the mainstream, and some of the ups and downs along the way.

Keeping Cool

Gas (LNG and LPG) shipping may once have been considered by some as a relatively niche part of global shipping, with the fleet and trade volumes dwarfed by other sectors. Even today, LNG and LPG carriers account for just 5% of total world fleet GT, and LNG and LPG trade accounted for just 3% of global seaborne volumes in 2015. However, following phases of rapid fleet growth, the combined gas carrier fleet now stands poised to top 100 million cbm of gas carrying capacity next year, more than double the size of the fleet at the end of 2007.

Gas Expands

Following expansion in LNG trade in the late 1990s, in the mid-2000s a glut of new export terminal sanctioning led to a surge in LNG carrier contracting, peaking at 10.9m cbm in 2004. This supported average fleet growth of 15% p.a. in the period 2000-08, to 40.3m cbm at the end of 2008. In comparison the LPG carrier fleet grew more steadily, though trade growth was supported by increased export volumes from the Middle East and Europe. Between 2000 and 2008, LPG carrier capacity increased from 13m cbm to 18m cbm, at an average rate of growth of 4% p.a. Across this period combined gas carrier capacity grew by an average of 10% p.a. to total 58.2m cbm by the end of 2008. However, after the economic downturn, sanctioning of liquefaction projects slowed, which limited LNG fleet growth, and growth in the LPG sector slowed too. Between 2008 and 2014, combined gas carrier fleet capacity grew by a much less rapid 6% p.a. on average, with even slower growth in 2011-12.

Powering On

Nevertheless, since the start of 2015 it has been full steam ahead for the gas carrier fleet. With LNG carrier ordering backed by the return to liquefaction terminal sanctioning in the 2010s and the vision of a cleaner energy future, and LPG carrier demand supported by the advent of fracking in the US and refinery capacity expansion elsewhere, 26.1m cbm of combined gas carrier capacity was ordered in 2013-15. This has supported rapid fleet growth in recent years and since the end of 2014, LPG carrier fleet capacity has grown by 32% and LNG carrier fleet capacity by 12%.

Mainstream Profile

So, the gas sector’s profile is fully in the mainstream today, and despite it’s relatively limited share of the world’s tonnage and global seaborne trade, in other ways it accounts for rather more weight. Gas carriers are complex, high value units; they account for 15% of the shipyard orderbook in CGT (shipyard work) terms today, and for an estimated value of $78bn, 9% of the world fleet total. And with a 20-year compound annual growth rate of 8% in combined capacity, and the 100 million cbm mark just around the corner, surely that’s one of modern shipping’s success stories? Have a nice day.

SIW1241 Graph of the Week