Archives for posts with tag: conteinerships

During July 2016, the containership fleet reached a landmark 20 million TEU in terms of aggregate capacity. To many it only seems like yesterday when the boxship fleet passed the 10 million TEU mark, back in April 2007. It took less than 10 years to double in capacity to reach the new milestone. Sprightly fleet growth indeed, but how rapid is it when compared to other parts of the world fleet?

Compound Crazy

Albert Einstein once called the impact of compound growth the ‘most powerful force in the universe’, and containership fleet capacity is a great example of this power. Total boxship capacity doubled from 5m TEU in size (in April 2001) to 10m TEU (in May 2007) in 6.2 years, and since then it has doubled in size again from 10m TEU to an astounding 20m TEU across just a further 9.3 years.

This rapid growth of the containership sector is a fairly well known story. In many respects the box sector is still a youthful part of the shipping world; since the inception of container shipping in the 1950s, the fleet has grown quickly from humble origins as trade has flourished. At the same time the fleet has upsized at a phenomenal rate. The average size of containerships in the fleet stood at 1,807 TEU in April 2001 and increased to 2,425 TEU in May 2007. Today, with behemoth boxships of over 19,000 TEU on the water, the average size of units in the fleet is 3,832 TEU, and the average size of those on order is even larger at 8,030 TEU.

Maturing Slowly

In contrast, some other shipping sectors can seem more ‘mature’, growing at a gentler rate. Tanker fleet capacity took almost 21 years to double to reach its current size of 540.9m dwt. In relative terms, the trade is indeed fairly mature, with average growth in volumes of 2.2% per annum over the last 20 years in combined crude and products trade. But interestingly, this is a sector now seeing rapid capacity growth, with an uptick in trade growth in recent years driving tanker ordering. In the last 19 months tanker fleet capacity has grown by 6.5%.

Bulk Bulge

However, the bulkcarrier fleet comfortably illustrates that the boxship sector has not been alone in experiencing rocketing growth. Although the vessels themselves may not have seen the same upsizing as boxships, bulker capacity expansion has been extraordinarily fast in recent times. Astonishingly, it took just 8.6 years from January 2008 to double to its current capacity of 784.1m dwt (though it had taken around 21 years before that to double previously). Nevertheless, bulker capacity expansion has slowed now, as dry bulk trade growth has hit the buffers.

Boom Time

So, the latest instance of a rapid doubling of fleet capacity is not a one-off. The explosion of boxship capacity has indeed been rapid, but in a world where shipbuilding output was hitting all-time highs not long ago, such growth has been a wider phenomenon. The overall world fleet has increased by 55% in dwt terms in the period since the onset of the global financial crisis in September 2008 alone. That’s a robust compound annual growth rate of 5.1%! Have a nice day, Einstein!

SIW1236 Graph of the Week

This week, containership fleet capacity has passed the 20 million TEU mark, another milestone in the rapid rise to prominence of the sector. Down the years, much of the capacity expansion has been driven by the delivery of larger and larger units at the big end of the fleet. However, the important role that smaller ‘feeder’ ships play in the container shipping network should never be overlooked.

Little And Large

Investment in containership newbuildings this year so far looks very different to the pattern seen in 2015. There was very limited investment in new boxships in 1H 2016, with just 75,000 TEU of capacity ordered compared to 2.2 million TEU in full year 2015. 1H 2016 saw 36 units contracted, and all were 3,300 TEU or below in size. This follows 104 orders for units below 3,000 TEU (‘Feeders’) in 2013, 85 in 2014 and 94 in 2015. This represents a limited, but steady flow of orders for small containerships, but, as the graph shows, the main focus in recent times has been elsewhere (especially in capacity terms). Only with a hiatus in the ordering of larger ships does the feeder element look particularly pronounced.

However, to casual observers, investment in feeder capacity might seem obviously warranted. The global liner network requires the integration of ships of all sizes, and clearly the focus of investment in recent years has been the big ships. Over 80% of capacity ordered since start 2010 has been for ships 8,000 TEU and above. But in reality it maybe hasn’t been hard to see why there has been a limited focus on investment in small and medium sized containerships. Timecharter earnings for smaller ships have languished at bottom of the cycle levels; the one year rate for a 1,700 TEU unit has averaged just $6,215/day since the end of 2008.

What’s Required?

Nevertheless, there appear to be clear drivers for future requirements. The orderbook below 3,000 TEU is limited, equivalent to 10% of fleet capacity compared to 33% above 8,000 TEU, and modern units are scarce. Demolition has picked up pace; 724 boxships have been sold for scrap since start 2012, about 70% of them below 3,000 TEU. And the feeder fleet has largely been shrinking since 2H 2011, with capacity below 3,000 TEU expected to see no real growth this year or next. Furthermore there are limits to network flexibility and the further cascading of larger ships into the feeder arena. The share of intra-regional deployment accounted for by ships 3,000 TEU and above has been fairly flat at just below 30% for some time. If extra intra-regional capacity is needed, that’s likely to mean demand for smaller units.

More On The Way?

So, it’s a broad landscape, and many market players foresee the likelihood of further activity in the feeder sector. Expectations remain of further limits to cascading and improved intra-regional trade growth (about 4% projected for intra-Asia in full year 2016). Improved charter rates, attractive pricing and available finance would help the investment case further, but the fundamentals for future requirement look supportive. Additional ordering has been on the agenda for a long while but things have taken their time. But in the box sector, sometimes the best things do (eventually) come in small packages.


With seaborne transportation accounting for the vast majority of the world’s international trade, the importance of the shipping industry to the mechanics of the world economy is generally fairly evident. But putting it into context in actual annual value terms, how does the magnitude of the shipping business compare to the size of some of the world’s economies?

Big Traders

There are a number of ways to attempt to put the annual impact of the shipping industry into the context of the wider world economy. One is to examine the value of seaborne trades. Seaborne iron ore trade totalled 1.3bn tonnes in 2015. At an annual average ore price of around $50/t, that equates to a value of $68bn. That’s about the size of the GDP of Kenya. However, that’s dwarfed by seaborne crude oil trade. At 37.4m bpd last year, at an average oil price of around $52/bbl, that’s an annual value of $717bn, almost equivalent to the GDP of Turkey (the world’s 18th largest economy). On the container side, taking port handling as an interesting metric, last year there were an estimated 664m TEU lifts at the world’s box ports. Average handling charges vary significantly, but if they worked out at $150/TEU that’s an economy of just under $100bn, almost the size of the GDP of Angola.

Of course the value of global seaborne trade must be huge. The WTO estimates the value of all global trade at $16.5 trillion, and almost 85% by volume moves by sea. Seaborne trade is probably a little skewed to relatively cheaper goods but even allowing for, say, 50% of the total value, that’s still over $8 trillion, heading towards the size of China’s economy!

Adding The Value

Another way to put shipping’s magnitude into context is to take a look at the value of the assets. Between 2007 and 2015 the average annual level of investment in newbuildings was $127bn. That’s bigger than the GDP of Hungary. Alternatively, taking the value of the fleet today, $904bn, and allowing for, say, another 15 years of trading (the average age by tonnage is around 10 years), would equate to a per annum value of $60bn, still bigger than the economy of Panama.

Call In The Revenue

But perhaps the clearest way to mirror GDP is to check the annual earnings of the vessels, just as GDP measures economic production. In 2016’s challenging market conditions, the ClarkSea Index has averaged $9,733/day (which would total aggregate earnings of $77bn in a full year across the c.22,000 vessels in the main volume sectors), but back in 2007 it averaged over $33,060/day (across over 15,600 vessels). Across a year that’s earnings of $189bn. Almost as big as the economy of shipping’s favourite investor nation, Greece!

A Big Whole

Shipping is just one of a wide range of economic activities on the planet. Sometimes its impact can be hard to put into context. But in terms of ‘economic magnitude’, elements of the shipping industry can be as big as the whole of one of the world’s larger economies, especially in a good year. Have a nice day!

SIW1231 Graph of the Week

Last week’s Analysis examined the key impacts of the opening of the new locks at the Panama Canal across a range of shipping sectors. This week, with the new locks up and running for commercial business, the focus falls on the containership sector, with the capability to allow the transit of larger boxships one of the key aims of the canal expansion project.

Wide Boys Welcome!

At the ‘old’ locks, containerships accounted for a large share of the transits, and an even larger share of the overall toll revenue on the back of high value box cargo transits most notably from Asia to the US East Coast. Based on the official ‘New Panamax’ dimensions, the new locks will allow containerships of up to around 13,500 TEU (dependent on the precise design) to transit. Only 207 boxships in today’s fleet will be too large to pass through. The amount of TEU capacity able to pass through the canal will rise from 37% to 85% of the fleet.

Bigger And Better?

Subsequently, a key impact on container shipping is the potential for upsizing of ships operating on the Asia-USEC trade. It looks likely that operators will upsize from ‘old Panamaxes’ initially to units around or above 8,000 TEU, with a number of carriers having already put new service plans in place. Even larger ships may eventually follow when port and infrastructure projects on the USEC are completed. Whether that is then followed by ‘cargo switching’ from Asia-USWC-‘landbridge’ to Asia-USEC ‘all water’ services on the basis of lower seaborne unit costs for now remains to be seen.

Another impact is on the structure of the containership sector. A new, more appropriate segmentation is needed. Along with the new vessel indicators and profiling described last week, Clarksons Research data will also provide fresh segmentation of the containership fleet from July onwards (see graph) to provide the most market-relevant statistics.

Splitting Up The Big Boys

The sector now looks different with new segments clear. The 8-11,999 TEU sector will comprise the initial wave of ‘Neo-Panamaxes’. The 12-14,999 TEU sector contains the larger ‘Neo-Panamaxes’ of the future. Today 59 ships in the 12-14,999 TEU sector can transit the new locks on the basis of the official dimensions, another 39 have dimensions so close to the limits one would imagine they are likely to transit, and a further 50 will probably fit through on the basis of the already mooted expansion of the beam restriction to 51m. There are a further 43 ships closely related in design terms to those detailed above, but above 15,000 TEU there is a clear step up to much longer and beamier designs. Deeper levels of segmentation will continue to track the decline in the ‘old Panamax’ sector.

Big News Is Old News?

So the opening of the new locks in Panama is big news for bigger boxships. Market watchers will have to keep a keen eye on the impact, and also get used to a new perspective on the market structure and data. But in a sector where there’s been so much upsizing in recent years anyway, perhaps that’s not such a new thing after all? Have a nice day.


On 26th June 2016, a landmark development for the shipping industry will occur with the opening of the new third set of locks at the Panama Canal. Around ten years in the making, the expansion will enable significantly larger ships to transit the Canal, which is likely to have a wide and significant range of implications across a number of shipping sectors.

Beam Me Through, Scotty!

Since opening in 1914, the Panama Canal has provided a key point of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Nearly 14,000 transits of the canal were recorded last fiscal year, carrying around 230mt of cargo. While this accounts for just 2% of total global seaborne trade, the canal is a key shipping lane for a number of vessel segments and cargo flows.

At a macro level, vessel upsizing trends over recent decades have significantly increased the number of ships that are too large to transit the canal. On the 20th June 2016, more than half (55%) of total dwt capacity in the world fleet was accounted for by ships too large to transit the canal. The new, larger locks will enable many additional vessels to transit, as the maximum permissible beam will initially be raised to 49m, up from 32.3m at the old locks, while the maximum LOA and draft at the new locks will be 366m and 15.2m respectively. On the basis of the ‘New Panamax’ dimensions, 79% of dwt tonnage in the world fleet will now be able to officially pass through the canal.

Walk On The Wide Side

The most significant impact of the opening of the new locks will be on the containership sector, which has accounted for around a third of all canal transits and half of the annual toll revenue. More than 1,400 boxships of 12.5m teu (63% of total containership fleet capacity) are too large to transit the old locks today, but only around 200 of 3.0m teu (15% of fleet capacity) will be too large to pass through the new locks. Vessels of up to and around 13,500 TEU will be able to transit, compared to around 4-5,000 teu previously. This is expected to drive significant changes in containership deployment, particularly on the Transpacific trade.

Let’s Go Wide

In addition, the opening of the new locks is generally thought likely to have an important impact on the LNG, LPG and car carrier sectors. All VLGCs will be able to transit the new locks, as will the majority of LNG carriers, compared to only a handful of small LNG carriers previously. This is expected to lead to an increase in LNG vessels transiting the canal, typically with exports from the US.

Locked In To A New Era

Clarksons Research is marking this important milestone through a number of data updates. Fleet databases now include vessel indicators for the ability to transit both the “New” and “Old” locks of the Panama Canal, which will be displayed on vessel profiles within Shipping Intelligence Network and World Fleet Register. Vessel segmentation within the containership sector will also be updated to best reflect the structure of the fleet in the context of the expanded canal. As the Panama Canal enters a new era, for many in the shipping industry it’s the perfect time to “go wide”. Have a nice day!


Amid fairly significant turmoil today in many of the key shipping sectors, there’s one area where extreme conditions have almost become the norm. Container freight rates across a range of trades are currently at rock bottom levels, making liner operations more challenging than ever. What have been the ingredients of this hazardous environment, and is there anything out there that could change the mix?

The Explosive Cocktail

Following the onset of the global economic downturn, many observers noted that container freight rates (the amount paid to move a box from A to B) appeared to have entered an era of increased volatility. As the graph shows, on the mainlane trades box freight rates started to fluctuate more dramatically as liner companies were forced into more active supply management to absorb huge deliveries of ‘mega’-boxship capacity. This has been particularly marked since early 2011 (‘Ingredient #1’), with at least 9 sets of peaks and troughs in the index on the graph evident since then.

Not A Good Mix

If the volatility wasn’t difficult enough for liner companies to manage, ‘Ingredient #2’ has been even tougher to stomach. Container freight rates have developed a clear propensity towards a downward trend, evident in particular in 2012-13 and most acutely and dramatically across last year. Pressure on rates has come from both cyclical and structural factors. Larger ships and the accompanying lower unit costs have backed a long-term downtrend in freight rates (with scale economy benefits seemingly passed down quickly to shippers). Meanwhile in 2015 the weakening supply-demand balance and lower bunker prices placed pressure on rates. The index on the graph fell from $1,290/TEU in Jan-15 to $385/TEU in Mar-16, illustrating the potent mix.

For liner companies (and charter owners dependent on operator requirements) this was definitely not a good mix. After a year of sliding rates on the mainlanes (and elsewhere), operators have faced up to loss-making levels. By March, according to the SCFI, the key Far East-Europe rate was averaging $224/TEU. That compares to post-2012 peak levels as high as $1,765/TEU. Enough to send anyone to the bar for a stiff drink!

A Nasty Double Shot

Of course, a particularly nasty cocktail of factors was at play last year. There were all time record deliveries of 12,000+ TEU capacity totalling 0.8m TEU. And a positive demand situation eroded pretty quickly with full year world container trade growth reaching just 2.4%.

Time To Get On The Wagon?

This all sounds familiar to critics of the liner business model, but is there any sign of the operators eschewing the cocktails and getting ‘on the wagon’? Well, ongoing major carrier consolidation could help if it brings ordering of very large ships under control. But might it just trigger another ‘round’ or two first? Otherwise it’s up to the demand side. But at least with box rates so low, it’s cheap to move a glass or two of wine around while we’re waiting. Even at $1,000/TEU it’s only 7 cents per bottle. Until things turn for the better, let’s raise a glass to the benefits of cheap container shipping!


Conditions in many sectors of the shipping market are extremely challenging today, but some asset market watchers might look at that as fertile ground for new opportunity. However, different parts of the market cycle pose different questions for shipping’s asset players. What does the historical data tell us about investor behaviour across the cycle in the key shipping sectors?

Where In The Cycle?

The graph illustrates the share of reported secondhand sale and purchase (S&P) activity since 1997 at different ‘price point quartiles’, across the three main sectors and also for total sales activity (see graph explanation for more detail). According to asset investment theory, one might not expect the pattern across the quartiles to be even. At the top end of the price cycle there are limited numbers of ‘optimistic’ buyers willing to make a deal with many keen to sell at rewarding levels, and at the bottom end there are fewer sellers ready to dispose of assets at challenged prices. But how does the pattern look across the shipping sectors?

Life At The Top

Tanker sales reveal a focus at the upper end with a 30% share in the top quartile, and 50% in the middle two quartiles. Less than 20% of sales fell in the bottom quartile. In the bulkcarrier S&P market, transactions have historically been even more concentrated in the upper two quartiles, which accounted for almost 60% of sales in 1997-2014, boosted by record sales numbers in 2007 to many ‘exuberant’ buyers when prices and markets were near to the peak. However, with asset values falling further in 2015, and the market remaining liquid in recent times, in part due to increased pressure from traditional shipping banks, the share of bulker sales in the bottom quartile has risen to 20%, more than in the tanker sector.

Boxships At The Bottom

In the containership sector, the pattern has been more differentiated. Sales in 1997-2014 were much more heavily weighted towards the bottom quartile, with over 30% of transactions occurring there. Often outside of the more traditional ownership structures, it appears that many investors have felt pressure to exit their positions in the prolonged doldrums since the financial crisis. The record number of sales in 2015, at a low point in the price cycle, amplified the trend; by March 2016, 34% of boxship sales since 1997 had taken place in the bottom quartile.

An Optimistic Bunch?

Overall, across all reported vessel sales, only 51% of transactions took place in the mid-quartiles, and almost 30% at the top end compared to 20% at the bottom. What does this mean? Does it make shipping investors an optimistic bunch?

Well, given some of the market ‘spikey-ness’ the top quartile here probably factors in some less than top quartile levels in terms of absolute price range, so that may not be fully true. But still, containership sector aside, it leaves analysts of today’s markets with something to chew over. Even at the darkest of times for some of the sectors, analysis of historical asset play activity could potentially provide some reassuring evidence of more ‘optimistic’ behaviour in the past.


The recycling market has started 2016 with a bang, with a huge volume of tonnage heading to demolition facilities. Many of the key shipping markets continue to be in a state of very ill health, and owners seem to be rushing to the emergency room. But with such a youthful global fleet on the water, how might this next episode of shipping’s medical drama play out?

Off To The Infirmary

So far this year, around 8m dwt of tonnage has been reported recycled – a dramatic start, and one which suggests that 2016 could be another very strong year for demolition, after a total of 39m dwt was recycled in 2015. A quick check-up on the age profile of the world fleet shows that despite the obvious youthful bias, there is still some elderly tonnage in operation; 6% of global dwt capacity (or 112m dwt) is aged 25 years or over. However, only around one third of this amount is accounted for by the three major volume sectors, an unfortunate circumstance given the degree to which two key patients, the bulkcarrier and containership sectors, are currently suffering.

Seeking Medicine

The delivery boom over the last decade has meant that the fleet in these two sectors is very young – the average bulkcarrier is less than 9 years old. Following elevated levels of scrapping since the start of the downturn, there is now only 23m dwt of bulker tonnage left aged 25 years or more (3% of the fleet), while only 2% of boxship fleet capacity is over 25 years old – a seemingly limited relief valve.

However, the distressed market conditions are leading to younger ships being scrapped. In 2012, the bulkcarriers scrapped were aged 28 years on average, but this fell to 25 years in 2015, and 23 years in January 2016 (reaching just 20 years in the Capesize sector). For the last few years, containerships have been scrapped at an average age of 23 years, but so far in 2016 this figure has fallen to just 19 years.

Prescribing Steel Therapy

The apparent willingness to demolish more youthful ships could have the potential to eventually underpin a more positive supply-demand balance. More ships were delivered (see graph) in 1992-96 (vessels now aged 20-24 years) than in 1987-91 (ships now 25-29 years old), and only a third of tonnage delivered in 1992-96 has since been removed. Deliveries rose further past 1997, so the share of fleet capacity aged 15 years or more rises to 18% in both the bulker and containership sectors – a greater volume offering a wider range of scrapping candidates. Owners seem to have been making use of this treatment option. Since the start of 2015, 37% of bulker tonnage and 42% of boxship capacity scrapped has been less than 20 years old.

What’s The Prognosis?

So, there’s plenty of capacity which can be recycled if owners can swallow the pill of selling less elderly units. With a strong dosage of demolition, bulk fleet growth could fall below 2% this year, and supply-side fundamentals in the boxship charter market sector should remain supportive. Firm demolition is far from a cure to the challenges faced, but it could be a way to limit some of the worst symptoms.


In the nativity story, the three ‘Wise Men’ each come bearing a gift for the baby Jesus. Today, gifts are more likely to have been transported by containership than by camel, but the boxship market itself has still been subject to a number of demand-side ‘humps’ this year. Unwrapping these trends suggests three rather unwelcome ‘gifts’ that the containership market has received in 2015.

Gifts From The East

Prior to the last 7 years, container trade growth had been rapid, averaging 9.6% per annum in 1996 to 2007 – an astonishing performance given the average 4.1% per annum expansion in global seaborne trade in the same period. Box trade flourished, as further cargoes were containerised and manufacturing was rapidly outsourced from the west to Asia (particularly in the 2000s). Container shipping became the planet’s chosen (low cost) way for moving general cargo around. The first major blip in the story was in 2009, when box trade fell for the first time in the history of containerisation, dropping 10% on the back of the global economic downturn. 2015 currently looks set to be the worst year since then, with trade growth expected to reach just 2.5%.

Hardly Gold

Three key factors have driven slower trade growth this year. The first is the contraction of the key Far East-Europe trade, reflecting a combination of the weak euro, continued challenging economic conditions in some European nations, and a stark fall in Russian volumes. It seems that this year has also seen some inventory de-stocking, bolstering the downward trend. Peak leg Far East-Europe trade is projected to drop by 3.8% in 2015, limiting total expansion in mainlane trade to around 0.4% this year.

The second factor has been the slowdown in the estimated rate of growth in intra-Asian volumes. This is an important bloc of container trade (around 50m teu) and has been one of the fastest growing parts in recent years. This year, the turbulence and slowing rate of growth in the Chinese economy, combined with issues in other Asian economies, has seen the estimated rate of intra-Asian growth slow in 2015, with total intra-regional trade now projected to grow by 3.6% this year, down from 6.0% in 2014.

Looking Myrrh-ky

Thirdly, the collapse in commodity prices, including crude oil, has had a heavily deleterious impact on box volumes into economies particularly dependent on commodity exports for income. Notably, growth in box imports into economies in Africa and South America have slowed, and total North-South trade is now expected to grow by only 1.8% this year, whilst Middle Eastern imports are also coming under pressure.

Frankly Incensed

So the world of container trade has indeed received three ‘gifts’ this year, but the outcome for containership demand has not been a joyful story. The Christmas season is usually prime time for thoughts of presents shipped by container around the world, but it seems that the boxship sector may have to wait beyond this year’s festivities to find a brighter-looking star on the horizon.


Idle capacity has been a feature of the containership sector since the economic downturn in 2008-09. Prior to that, box freight rates tended to vary according to fairly macro factors, and liner companies appeared less inclined to resort to micro supply management to address imbalances. But in recent years, there have been clear phases of containership ‘idling’, each highly reflective of conditions in the sector.

The Worst Of Times

Global box trade dropped by 9% in 2009, and liner companies were left with little option but to idle significant levels of capacity to resurrect freight levels from rock bottom levels (Phase 1 on the graph). By the end of 2009, 1.5m TEU, or 11% of total fleet capacity stood idle. This did at least help push freight rates back up.

Not The Best Of Times

It did of course have a negative impact on the charter market, leaving owners, with an easy supply of laid up ships lurking in the background for charterers to access, unable to bid up rates. But, with some believing the world economy to be recovering quickly, substantial amounts of idle capacity were soon reactivated and by the end of September 2010, there was only 1.6% of the fleet idle (Phase 2). However, with freight levels having dropped again, further lay-up followed, and by end March 2012, the position had been reversed and 5.9% of the fleet was idle (Phase 3). Charter owner tonnage accounted for around 70% of the total by the summer of 2012, and most of the idle capacity was in classic charter market sizes, with only 3% above 5,000 TEU, putting pressure back on charter rates.

Better Times?

In the next phase, market conditions very slowly appeared to become more helpful, and idle capacity gradually fell, with the winter peak receding each year (Phase 4); idle capacity peaked at 6% of the fleet in early 2012, 5% in 2013 and 4% in 2014. But the charter owners’ share stayed high, keeping pressure on the charter market. It took until well into 2014 for rates to see much positive traction. By the end of 2014, idle capacity was finally more limited, at 1.3% of the fleet, reflective of the improved environment.

Time For A Change (Again)?

Today, despite severe freight rate pressure, idle capacity is still fairly limited at 2.5% of the fleet, but it is on the rise and the charter market is softening, ceding some of its gains. Larger ships had begun to account for a greater share of the idle pool (24% over 5,000 TEU in May) but recent weeks have seen a return to increased smaller ship idling.

So how will Phase 5 play out? There are a range of scenarios. Liner companies might continue to compete aggressively on the mainlanes with an apparent surplus of big ship capacity, and endure freight rate pain without idling too much more capacity. Or to protect freight rates they might start to idle a greater number of larger ships. Alternatively, they might once again pass down the pressure to the smaller ship arena, leaving more significant levels of capacity there to impact on the charter market. Much might depend on the flexibility of tonnage. Either way, once again, the development of idle boxship capacity will be a sign of the times. Have a nice day.