Archives for posts with tag: Clarksons Research

British cycling star Chris Froome has taken on one long cycle after another, currently tackling the Tour Of Spain following his fourth Tour De France victory back in July. Two long cycles are ongoing in the shipbuilding sector too, and this week’s Analysis takes a look at the progress of the delivery cycles in the merchant vessel and mobile offshore sectors, through a challenging period for the industry.

For the full version of this article, please go to Shipping Intelligence Network.

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By the late 1800s, the shipping industry had been transformed by the introduction of steam power and iron ships. Coal and grain were two of the most important cargoes, alongside timber, sugar, cotton and tea. While technology, the sheer scale of the business, and the global cargo mix, have of course all changed since then, dry bulk cargoes have retained a position at the heart of global seaborne trade.

For the full version of this article, please go to Shipping Intelligence Network.

Now that half the year has passed, a review of offshore project sanctioning might be timely. Activity has picked up in 2017, especially for larger projects with CAPEX allocations of at least $500m. The uptick in FIDs has coincided with improved E&P budget guidance from many IOCs. So oil price volatility notwithstanding, could this be an sign of generally improving prospects for larger offshore projects?

Large Projects On The Rise

Offshore field project sanctioning reached a peak of 120 FIDs in 2012. Since then, sanctioning activity has been under pressure from a range of factors, most notably the weaker energy price environment that has prevailed since 2H 2014. Indeed, oil company E&P spending cuts induced by the falling oil price in 2015 precipitated a 33% decline in FIDs that year. Larger projects (with an estimated CAPEX of at least $500m) have been hit the worse, with the number of such developments in 2016 to receive an FID down by 60% on 2012. In comparison, the number of smaller projects sanctioned in 2016 was down by a less severe 32% on 2012.

However, 2017 is (so far) looking rather more promising: 31 offshore field projects received FIDs in 1H 2017, of which 48% were larger projects. Among these were Coral FLNG Ph.1 ($7bn), Leviathan Ph.1 ($3.75bn), Liza Ph.1 ($3.2bn) and Njord A Upgrade ($1.6bn). FIDs have been stimulated by the higher (albeit volatile) oil price, as well as by successes in reducing offshore project costs (by around 30-40% on start 2014, on average).

Small Runs Rule

That being said, while it is true that sanctioning of larger projects seems to be on the rise, it is important to note that many such projects (including all those named above bar Liza Ph.1) were conceived pre-downturn and were on the verge of obtaining an FID in 2014. This implies that the recent uptick in large-project activity may not be sustainable, especially as the backlog of such projects continues to fall. Indeed, the history of start-up delays and cost over-runs at mega-projects such as Kashagan Ph.1 ($48bn) and Greater Gorgon Ph.1 ($55bn) had already prompted operators to rethink the viability of larger offshore projects even before the oil price downturn. Onshore US basins are also potentially problematic for offshore projects, insofar as they compete (quite effectively) for scarce investment dollars.

Efficiency Matters

As a result of these considerations, operators have been downsizing many of the other large-scale projects planned prior to the fall in the oil price. Browse is set to use two FPSOs instead of three FLNGs, for example, while Bonga SW “Lite” now entails an FPSO with a processing capacity 33% smaller than before. Many operators are also placing more emphasis on subsea tiebacks to existing facilities, instead of major new offshore hubs (even if this means lower production volumes). Adapting to the potential “lower for longer” oil price outlook thus seems to be a priority for many upstream players.

So although FIDs at larger projects have picked up, looking beyond the backlog of projects from before the downturn, such developments seem to be less in favour. Scratching the surface, small projects are at least an offshore outlet for upstream investment and in the long run, perhaps cost savings cemented post-2014 might make large projects more competitive.

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Shipping is a cyclical industry and for shipyards the current trough in newbuilding orders has put further pressure on capacity. While the scale of the current surplus appears huge, this is not the first time that the shipbuilding industry has grappled with excess capacity. Looking back to the past, and specifically the shipbuilding cycle of the late 1970s, what can be learnt from previous experience?

Enjoying The Highs

The shipbuilding industry has a habit of ramping up production capacity rapidly. In 2010 shipyards broke all previous delivery records, outputting 53.2m CGT (in dwt and GT terms deliveries peaked in 2011). Compared to 2004, early into the most recent ordering boom, this was a 122% increase in deliveries. Looking back to the mid-1970s, there was a similar burst of activity as strong newbuild demand saw yard output double between 1972 and 1976 to 10.2m CGT.

What Goes Up…

As in the late 1970s, economic downturn and its impact on the shipping markets led to a significant fall in yard deliveries after their peak in 2010. The initial decrease in output was faster and sharper in the 1970s, with deliveries declining by 64% between 1976 (Year 0) and 1979 (Year 3). The current cycle has seen a more gradual fall in deliveries, declining 34% between 2010 and 2014 with 178 yards reported to have completed delivery of their orderbooks in 2012 (Year 2).

…Must Come Down

Shipyard output is still in decline. Though the surge in ordering in 2013 has helped support delivery volumes, current estimates are for an 18% fall in shipyard output in 2018. Many anticipate that the current delivery cycle will dip around 2019 (Year 9), suggesting a shorter cycle than before. It also seems unlikely that delivery levels will fall by as much as in the late 1980s, as the same pattern would imply a further 47% reduction in output from 2018 estimates to around 15m CGT.

Time To Recover?

After the 1970s crash, it took over a decade for shipbuilding output to recover. Today, following one of the weakest levels of newbuild contracting on record in 2016, the overcapacity which has characterised the global shipbuilding industry in recent years is even more prominent. While 353 shipbuilders currently have a vessel (1,000 GT or above) on order, almost half of these shipyards have failed to win a contract since the start of 2016.

If the current shipbuilding cycle were to follow the same pattern as in the 1970s, we would only be 7-8 years in, with a full recovery still some way away. However, the situation will improve if contracting levels increase. Trade growth, the replacement of older, less efficient ships and stricter environmental regulation could support yard capacity in the future through a recovery in newbuild demand.

Looking back at the shipbuilding cycle of the 1970s, it is clear that the industry has faced similar challenges in the past. It seems unlikely that we have reached the bottom of the current cycle, and pressure to remove capacity remains. Shipbuilders will be hoping that newbuild demand drivers come through quickly to stem the duration of this particular downturn.

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Conventionally, the container shipping market is viewed as made up of two key elements: the freight market for moving boxes from A to B, and the charter market for hiring ships. Often these markets are happily moving in sync, but that’s not always the case. How does the relationship work and how closely have these markets moved in relation to each other, both in recent times and historically?

Happy Couple?

Let’s start with recent history. Improved fundamentals in 2016, when box trade grew by 3.8% but containership capacity expanded by just 1.2%, and into 2017, have had a twin impact on the container shipping markets. Firstly they helped the box freight market bottom out. The mainlane freight rate index (see graph) increased from 24 in Mar-16 to 73 in Jan-17, and this pattern has been mirrored across many trade lanes. Secondly, the backdrop eventually helped support a slightly improved charter market, with rates moving away from the bottom of the cycle in late Q1 2017. In theory, demand from freight market end users (shippers) filters down to the vessel charter market in the end, with additional volume driving charterers (liner companies) to access additional units (from owners).

Splits And Separations

But does the power of the fundamentals always drag the two markets along together? It is not always the case; they often move apart. Before the financial crisis, the freight market appeared somewhat less volatile than today, but that did not always see the markets in sync. Despite more than 20% cargo growth in 2005-06, and the freight market holding most of its ground, the charter rate index slumped by 47% from an all-time high of 172 in Apr-05 to 91 in Dec-06, as super-cycle peak rates proved unsustainable.

The post-downturn period has seen similar instances. The box shipping markets moved into an era of ‘micro’ management of supply (slow steaming, idling and cascading) and this has impacted both freight and charter markets. In both early 2011 and 1H 2015 charter rates rose as freight rates dropped like a stone. In 2011 the freight rate index dropped by 38% to 47 whilst the charter rate index rallied, as operators deployed additional capacity to the detriment of freight rates. But soon after the opposite occurred, and freight rates increased but charter rates dropped back to bottom of the cycle levels where they remained for the next three years.

Re-Coupling…

In the long-term, however, the two spheres do appear to be aligned. What simple inspection suggests, the numbers confirm. In only 33 of the months on the graph (21%) have the markets actually moved in opposite directions (excluding monthly movements of less than 1%).

Let’s Stick Together!

So, the two box markets do move independently at times but they often move in sync and when apart they tend to re-align (what econometricians might call an ‘error correction mechanism’). Perhaps this just confirms that ‘cargo is king’ and the supply side eventually adjusts. Whatever the case, box shipping’s famous couple can’t keep themselves apart for too long. Have a nice day.

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A few weeks ago, OPEC and other major oil producers agreed to extend 1.73m bpd of production cuts until the end of Q1 2018. Despite this, oil prices have continued to slide, with Brent failing to close above $50/bbl this week. While a range of factors have contributed to this trend, perhaps the most important is US tight oil production. So what is going on in the shale patch? And why does it matter to shipping?

How Unconventional!

If nothing else, US tight oil production retains the ability to surprise. As was noted after the OPEC meeting in May (SIW 1,273), “it remains to be seen if shale production quickly offsets” the cuts. Well, if the early signs are anything to go by, this is clearly not an impossibility.

Tight or shale oil is oil extracted from otherwise almost impermeable geology via “fracking”, a process wherein fluids mixed with sands are pumped at pressure into well bores, creating fractures in the rock through which oil and gas can flow. In terms of oil price dynamics, the key aspect of shale projects is speed: they can have lead times measured in weeks and so are very responsive to changes in oil prices. But in turn, as tight oil production ramps up, it can put pressure on prices, as recent history shows.

Remarkable Resilience

The US tight oil sector really took off in 2011, with production more than tripling from 1.70m bpd to reach a peak of 5.47m bpd in March 2015, as the graph shows. At this point, tight oil accounted for 6% of global oil supply (96m bpd) and equated to 55% of the net growth in supply from 2011. Such rapid supply growth had not been priced into markets, a key factor in the 2014 oil price plunge. A partial revival in mid-2015 was smothered as US drilling was stimulated again. And, since the US land rig count hit a new low of 380 units in May 2016, activity has again been on the up; the November 2016 OPEC deal accelerated this and the land rig count now stands at over 900 units. Tight oil production growth now equates to around 35% of the OPEC cuts. Its resilience (via cost deflation) in the face of lower oil prices continues, it seems, though it may prove self-defeating yet again. Even so, tight oil could now be a long term part of the oil price context. A few years ago, forecasters saw US tight oil production peaking circa 2020. Revised projections taking into account new technologies and updated resource surveys do not see US tight oil output peaking before the 2030s.

More Surprises?

The negative and positive implications for shipping of higher oil prices were covered in detail previously (SIW 1,273). The converse applies to lower oil prices, with offshore suffering from reduced E&P activity but the merchant fleet perhaps seeing benefits from cheaper bunkers and crude oil trade growth. Tight oil also has implications for trade flows. For example, now that export restrictions have been lifted, around 0.7m bpd of crude oil was exported from the US via tankers in Q1 2017.

So a factor that was barely on the radar a decade ago has become a key determinant of oil prices, potentially for the long haul. Moreover, tight oil has a range of ramifications for shipping that merit close monitoring. Once again, shipping appears inextricably linked to a key facet of the global economy. Have a nice day.

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In the ‘Three Card Trick’ or game of ‘Find The Lady’ beloved by hustlers everywhere, the aim is to track the movement of one item amongst three, but blink and you’ll miss it! Shipping’s orderbook appears to have its own version of this pastime, with the three largest shipowning nations, in terms of the volume of tonnage on order, swapping places frequently.

Are You Watching Closely?

Today, Japanese owners account for the largest orderbook across all owner nationalities, with 488 ships (100 GT and above) of 28.2m GT on order. This year, the size of their orderbook has surpassed that of their Chinese counterparts, leaving Japanese owners on top of this particular pile. At the same time the Japanese own the world’s second largest fleet (164.2m GT) behind Greek owners (210.1m GT). This change is the latest in a recent set of switches in the leadership of ownership of the global orderbook.

Switch One

Following the boom in ordering preceding the global economic downturn, the orderbook stood at its highest ever level (416.6m GT) in October 2008. At this point in time it was Greek owners who accounted for the largest orderbook, and by some margin, 56.5m GT, ahead of the German owners in second place with 41.4m GT (today this has dwindled to just 3.3m GT). Since then, things have largely gone one way for the Greek orderbook. Today it stands at 14.7m GT, 74% smaller than back in October 2008, and it is the third largest in the world. The Greek fleet has meanwhile maintained a healthy degree of expansion, with net asset play gains adding firmly to deliveries.

Switch Two

By start 2011 the Chinese owners’ orderbook was the world’s second largest and across the period 2012-15 it vied with the Greek orderbook for pole position before pulling ahead last year. Ordering, often state-backed, and significantly at Chinese yards, propelled the Chinese orderbook to become the world’s largest by October 2015, and today it stands at 24.8m GT (17% of the Chinese fleet), still close to the largest in dwt terms (39.1m dwt).

Switch Three

The final switch came in December 2016 when Japanese owners took the lead in the orderbook stakes. The Japanese orderbook surged in 2015 as Japanese owners contracted 22.0m GT, often bulkers (42%) and largely at domestic yards (87%). The global orderbook is much smaller than it was back in 2009 (at 136.6 m GT), but the Japanese orderbook has held its own through 2016 and into 2017 to take top spot, and today is equivalent to 17% of the Japanese fleet.

Top Hat Trick

So, against the background of a declining orderbook since 2008, the Japanese orderbook has switched from third to first position. But it’s still close and the Chinese orderbook is just 3.4m GT smaller today. Contracting has been extremely limited last year and this year so far, but at some point it will come back in greater volumes and then it will be necessary to watch the movements in the orderbook even more intently. Have a nice day.

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