Archives for posts with tag: Baltic

The film Transporter starring Jason Statham ought to appeal to shipping folk. There’s a big action scene on a containership and the “transporter”, with his computer-like karate skills, has a commercial philosophy which consists of three absolute rules. Rule 1 – “never change the deal”; Rule 2 – “no names”; Rule 3 – “never open the package”. Could these be helpful in our branch of the transport business?

Our Word Is Our Bond

Rule 1 certainly can. Shipping is famous for sticking to its word, and Baltic members will enjoy the opening scene of the movie. Statham is waiting outside a bank, in his impeccable BMW get-away car, when four bank robbers jump in. But the deal was to transport only three, so Statham refuses to move. As police sirens wail, his clients solve the problem by shooting number four and pushing him out of the car. A better solution than arbitration, given the circumstances, but not one the Baltic recommends!

Shipowner With No Name

The Transporter’s second rule is also close to the heart of many shipowners – “no names”. During the 20th century shipping became a rather anonymous business, with the majority of ships flagged out under brass plate companies to avoid unwelcome costs. This practice of giving the ship a different name and nationality from the owner has gained wide acceptance and the “flagged out” fleet grew to 40% of world shipping in the 1980s and over 70% today. But Mr Statham’s “no names” rule is under pressure as the EU and US seek transparency so that the “responsible party” for pollution and terrorism incidents can be traced and apprehended.

P3 Package Poker

Which brings us to the 3rd rule – “never open the package”. The problem this rule addresses is that opening the package can produce unexpected consequences. It happens in the movie when the transporter opens the package and finds a girl and it can happen in business too. Take the recent “P3” package. The world’s three biggest (European) container operators decided that cooperation would give them a cost advantage. They packaged themselves as “P3” and asked for approval from the authorities. The EU agreed, but unexpectedly China did not. Why? One explanation is the balance of fleet ownership. Europe is a massive exporter of shipping services, with a fleet twice its ship demand, whilst China and SE Asia are big importers and exporters with relatively smaller fleets (see graph). To date China and Asia have accepted this imbalance, but maybe the world is changing.

Who Rules The Waves?

So, can the shipping industry learn from Mr Statham’s pithy approach to the transport business? “Never change the deal” is a core market principle and although “no names” does not work so well today as it used to, shipping has something to gain from keeping its head down. But it’s the unexpected consequences of opening the package that drives the film and maybe smart shipping players can learn something from Mr Statham’s error. Stick to the deal, keep your head down and whatever you do, never open the package, however interesting the contents may seem. Have a nice day.

SIW1127

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OIMT201405Russia is forecast to account for 13% of world crude oil production and 18% of world natural gas production in 2014. While its prodigious Siberian flows tend to receive most of the credit for this feat, fields located off the country’s 16 million km of coastline are nonetheless projected to produce 390,000 bpd oil and 2.64 bcfd gas in 2014. So where exactly is Russian offshore production to be found? And what is the outlook?

Mastering the Arctic

As the Graph of the Month shows, offshore oil and gas production in Baltic & Arctic Russia stagnated after the break-up of the USSR, declining to 0.03m boepd in 2013, when it accounted for 4% of Russian offshore production. This trend was thrown into reverse when the Prirazlomnoye field came onstream in December 2013. Located 23km from shore in the Pechora Sea, the field is exploited via a ice-class platform and production is scheduled to reach 120,000 bpd by 2019. New technologies and robust oil prices are thus unlocking reserves hitherto stranded, and by 2023 Arctic oil and gas is forecast to constitute 11% of Russia’s offshore production.

Caspian and Crimean Conquests

Russia’s southern offshore fields, mainly in the Caspian, accounted for 9% of Russian offshore production in 2013. In the Caspian, as in the Arctic, harsh conditions have limited field development and disincentivised efforts to halt production decline. However, as in the Arctic, decline is now forecast to be arrested. Lukoil, for example, are planning substantial investment over the next four years at fields like Khvalynskoye and Yuri S. Kuvykin, where ice-class jack-up production units are likely to make development feasible. By 2023, the area is forecast to account for 24% of Russian offshore oil and gas production (excluding gas produced by fields off the Crimea, over which Russia now has de facto control, and which produced 410m cfd in 2013).

Expanding Eastwards

The Russian Far East is a relatively new area of offshore E&P. The Sakhalin-2 project started up in 1996 but offshore activity is still geographically limited, even if production volumes, at 0.78m boepd, are significant. The area accounted for 88% of Russian offshore production in 2013. Moreover, the Far East is Russia’s window on the developing economies of the Asia Pacific region, so companies are seeking to increase activity there, particularly with regards to LNG. In October 2013, the first Sakhalin-3 field, Kirinskoye, a subsea-to-shore development, began ramping up to 580m cfd. Further such field developments are planned out to 2023, when the area is projected to produce 0.95m boepd, its share falling to 65% despite new Capex due to faster Arctic and Caspian growth.

Thus production is forecast to grow in each of Russia’s offshore areas, driven largely by investment in high-spec jack-up, fixed platform and subsea field solutions. Total offshore oil production is projected to grow with a CAGR of 8.9% from 2014 to reach 890,000 bpd in 2023, and gas production likewise at 2.5% to reach 3.36 bcfd. Offshore would then account for 6.7% of the country’s oil and gas production, a far cry from the 2% nadir of post-Soviet decay.