Shipping is a cyclical business. For many years, Clarksons Research has tracked the ups and downs of its cycles via the ClarkSea Index, a weighted average of vessel earnings in the main shipping sectors.  In the first half of August, the index averaged less than $7,500/day, around 60% down on July 2015’s ‘mini-peak’, with most sectors having weakened. But how long should one expect a downturn to last?

Tired…

As summer 2016 has progressed, owners could be forgiven an element of downturn fatigue. Average bulkcarrier earnings from January to July 2016 were 21% down year-on-year, whilst the equivalent containership index fell by 37%. Average weighted LPG carrier earnings lost 49%. Even the tanker sector, which had been buoyed by lower oil prices stimulating demand, was down by 35% in terms of its component element of the ClarkSea Index. Both crude and product tanker earnings levels have softened over the course of Q2 2016.

Nor is the decline restricted to the major sectors. Offshore drilling rig dayrates are down by a further 30% or so year-on-year, and OSV term rates about the same amount. LNG carrier spot charter rates are 24% lower. Multi-purpose vessel charter rates have also come under further pressure. Amongst the few areas to have shown signs of improvement have been the ro-ro and ferry markets, but these are far from volume sectors.

…Crotchety…

So, the industry is undergoing a downturn, and it would be reasonable to ask: how long might the pain last for? Clearly, there are external macro-economic factors, such as the policies of the Chinese state, actions by OPEC or the effects of the Brexit decision, which might have specific influences on the future. However, perhaps past cycles could provide an indication. As the graph shows, the progress of the current weaker market has followed the trend of some previous downward moves – with the clear exception of the 2008-09 crash.

…And Emotional

The graph shows that, over the last 25 years, major downward movements in the ClarkSea Index have tended to begin to be reversed around a year to eighteen months after they began. Of course, the picture is complicated by seasonal factors. Additionally, a “dead-cat bounce” is also never off the cards: for example, the first signs of recovery in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. This improvement, between the one and two year marks on the graph, was quickly snuffed out, partly by the heavy ordering of bulkcarriers, helping to prevent a continued recovery along a similar trajectory to previous cycles.

In 2016, the market has probably learnt this lesson, with newbuild ordering numbers lower than at any point in the last two decades. Other actions are also being taken to try to turn the market balance around: ‘non-delivery’ of newbuild tonnage in the first seven months stands at 45%, whilst owners scrapped 30.2m dwt, 33% up when annualised with potential to get close to the record of 58.4m dwt set in 2012. So, it is possible that the index may follow previous trends, and begin to reverse course. But as well as a more controlled supply side, short-term demand will also help determine whether the market stalls, or can embark on the road to recovery. Have a nice holiday.

SIW1235 Graph of the Week

In the world of seaborne trade, distance forms a crucial element in terms of determining how much demand for vessel capacity is created by trade volumes. One interesting measure of this is the estimated average haul of global seaborne trade. However, since the turn of the millennium, the historical trend isn’t quite as easy to follow as one might imagine.

Back Where We Started?

Across the period 2000-15, estimated global seaborne trade increased by 70% from 6.4bn tonnes to 10.8bn tonnes. Over the same 15-year period, the total in terms of tonne-miles jumped 71% from around 31,300 to 53,500 billion tonne-miles. As a result of these very similar growth rates, the ‘average haul’ of each tonne of seaborne trade didn’t move too much across the period as a whole, inching up from 4,926 to 4,944 miles. That’s on average an upward trend of just 1.3 miles per year! However, through this period there were clearly elements of seaborne trade which were being stretched, but others where the average haul was shrinking.

Down Then Up, And Again!

In 2000-02 the overall average haul declined. Crude trade volumes were falling, particularly on some of the longer-haul trades from the Middle East and West Africa. The average haul of dry bulk trade was declining with a firm rise in  Australia-Far East coal volumes. In containers, the fastest growth was being seen on some of the intra-regional trades. However, in 2003-06, average haul rose again, almost back to 2000 levels, with firm increases in the average haul of iron ore and grain trade on the back of growing exports from the Americas to the Far East.

Then, in 2007-09 things turned again and average haul headed downwards once more. This included a drop in the average haul of coal trade on the back of a rise in short-haul Asian imports. The average haul of container cargoes also fell in 2007-08, partly driven by a strong increase in short-haul intra-Asian trade. Finally, in 2010-15 overall average haul increased once again, with a firm rise in the average haul of crude oil, underpinned by Chinese import growth, leaving us almost exactly back where we started in 2000.

Tonnes And Tonnes

So, across the whole of seaborne trade, the statistics actually tell us that it’s the expansion in volumes which has accounted for the lion’s share of the additional seaborne tonne-miles in the last 15 years. But trade patterns in individual cargo types do change, and no-one should rule out the possible impact of new longer trades; there are still parts of the global trade matrix to fill out further.

No Surprises?

However, so far this century, despite short-term fluctuations, average haul has not really changed too much. Maybe we shouldn’t be too surprised given the relatively fixed origin of many of the commodities moved by sea? The recent trend is upwards, but intra-regional trading blocs are becoming more cemented. Perhaps the best approach is to follow the advice of many a wise shipowner in challenging times: keep the cargo moving (and don’t worry about how far it’s going!).

SIW1234 Graph of the Week

This week, the Bank of England put into place its action plan following the UK referendum on 23rd June, which indicated the British population’s preference to leave the European Union. While the political dust has yet to settle, shipping market observers have had time to form their views on the impact of ‘c’ on the industry. This week’s Analysis attempts to put the UK and the EU’s role in shipping in context.

Holding On

Once upon a time, of course, Britannia ‘ruled the waves’ and Great Britain, with its colossal maritime heritage (remember the British Empire?) was one of the world’s leading lights in ship ownership and shipbuilding. Today the story is a little different. UK owners account for just 2% of the global fleet in GT terms. The EU as a whole, however, remains a significant player, with 36% of world tonnage. While market share has shifted to the Asia-Pacific (39%), EU owners have held their own, led by the world’s largest owner nation in Greece, which has not been subject to its own ‘Grexit’ just yet.

Sailed East

Historically, Europeans were leading shipbuilders too, but in the modern era shipbuilding is dominated by Asia. In 2015, EU builders took 1.9m CGT of new orders (over 1,000 GT), 5% of the global total, and today account for 8% of the orderbook in CGT, whilst China, Korea and Japan together account for 84%. Europeans are now largely builders in the niche markets, dominating the cruise sector and maintaining a focus on small ships. Within the EU, the UK’s contribution is limited, with just two merchant vessels over 1,000 GT built since 2011.

Big Bloc

In terms of trade, the UK, given its status as the world’s 5th largest economy, accounts for a significant volume of imports and exports. However, in a global context these account for a relatively modest share. The UK’s imports account for an estimated 2% of global seaborne trade and its exports 1%. The EU, meanwhile, is much more significant, as befits its role as the world’s largest trading bloc, accounting for an estimated 16% of seaborne imports and 12% of exports.

Service Culture

One area where the UK and Europe maintain importance is as service providers. The UK is the world’s 14th largest flag and EU flags account for 18% of world tonnage. Lloyd’s Register in the UK is still a leading class society and along with DNV-GL and BV, the EU’s heavy-hitters, class 44% of the world fleet. Furthermore, London still remains one of the world’s pre-eminent maritime business hubs at the forefront of legal services, insurance and shipbroking too!

Wider, Still & Wider

However ‘Brexit’ plays out, it won’t go without notice. In fleet ownership or trade terms, the UK alone is not so significant (though the EU as a whole is). Perhaps the more important impact might be the wider fallout of uncertainty (or worse) surrounding one of the world’s largest economies. Meanwhile, the UK will be hoping that London can retain its role at the centre of commercial maritime affairs. Leaver or Remainer, have a nice day.

SIW1233 Graph of the Week

This week, containership fleet capacity has passed the 20 million TEU mark, another milestone in the rapid rise to prominence of the sector. Down the years, much of the capacity expansion has been driven by the delivery of larger and larger units at the big end of the fleet. However, the important role that smaller ‘feeder’ ships play in the container shipping network should never be overlooked.

Little And Large

Investment in containership newbuildings this year so far looks very different to the pattern seen in 2015. There was very limited investment in new boxships in 1H 2016, with just 75,000 TEU of capacity ordered compared to 2.2 million TEU in full year 2015. 1H 2016 saw 36 units contracted, and all were 3,300 TEU or below in size. This follows 104 orders for units below 3,000 TEU (‘Feeders’) in 2013, 85 in 2014 and 94 in 2015. This represents a limited, but steady flow of orders for small containerships, but, as the graph shows, the main focus in recent times has been elsewhere (especially in capacity terms). Only with a hiatus in the ordering of larger ships does the feeder element look particularly pronounced.

However, to casual observers, investment in feeder capacity might seem obviously warranted. The global liner network requires the integration of ships of all sizes, and clearly the focus of investment in recent years has been the big ships. Over 80% of capacity ordered since start 2010 has been for ships 8,000 TEU and above. But in reality it maybe hasn’t been hard to see why there has been a limited focus on investment in small and medium sized containerships. Timecharter earnings for smaller ships have languished at bottom of the cycle levels; the one year rate for a 1,700 TEU unit has averaged just $6,215/day since the end of 2008.

What’s Required?

Nevertheless, there appear to be clear drivers for future requirements. The orderbook below 3,000 TEU is limited, equivalent to 10% of fleet capacity compared to 33% above 8,000 TEU, and modern units are scarce. Demolition has picked up pace; 724 boxships have been sold for scrap since start 2012, about 70% of them below 3,000 TEU. And the feeder fleet has largely been shrinking since 2H 2011, with capacity below 3,000 TEU expected to see no real growth this year or next. Furthermore there are limits to network flexibility and the further cascading of larger ships into the feeder arena. The share of intra-regional deployment accounted for by ships 3,000 TEU and above has been fairly flat at just below 30% for some time. If extra intra-regional capacity is needed, that’s likely to mean demand for smaller units.

More On The Way?

So, it’s a broad landscape, and many market players foresee the likelihood of further activity in the feeder sector. Expectations remain of further limits to cascading and improved intra-regional trade growth (about 4% projected for intra-Asia in full year 2016). Improved charter rates, attractive pricing and available finance would help the investment case further, but the fundamentals for future requirement look supportive. Additional ordering has been on the agenda for a long while but things have taken their time. But in the box sector, sometimes the best things do (eventually) come in small packages.

SIW1232

In recent years, Australia has been a major growth area for offshore gas production and a key driver of offshore CAPEX. However, the prospects for Australian gas projects that have yet to be sanctioned are looking increasingly uncertain due to weaker LNG prices and cost overruns at existing projects. The outlook for Australian offshore projects may also be complicated by the recent Australian general election.

Gas Powered

Historically, the majority of offshore oil and gas production in Australia has been produced from Southern Australia, particularly from the Gippsland Basin. However, E&P activity in recent years has moved offshore North West Australia, where the emphasis is on large, deepwater gas projects. As a result, Australian offshore gas production increased with a robust CAGR of 7.9% from 2010 to 2015, reaching 5.88bn cfd last year and making Australia the fifth largest offshore natural gas producer globally.

Ample Supplies

This trend is expected to continue with the start-up of Phase One of the Gorgon gas project earlier in the year, increasing Australia’s 2016 estimated offshore gas production to 6.44bn cfd. This is probably just the beginning as Australia is projected to become an even bigger offshore gas producer. The country currently accounts for 10 projects that are undergoing EPC or Installation & Commissioning. Foremost amongst these are gas mega-projects such as Chevron’s Wheatstone, Shell’s Prelude and Inpex’s Ichthys LNG developments, which are scheduled to start-up in 2017. This is anticipated to accelerate Australia’s projected offshore gas production to 9.10bn cfd in 2017, before levelling off at 10.9bn cfd in 2020.

Moreover, onshore projects like Gladstone LNG and Australia Pacific LNG, which are now online, have begun to ramp up production. This is likely to lead to a rapid growth in available supply, arguably pressuring market fundamentals and so weakening spot LNG prices. Consequently, the combination of low spot prices, abundant supply and the development of associated gas reserves off Australia could hit the commercial prospects of many potential gas projects off Australia. Additionally, spot gas purchases could also gain favour against term contracts, possibly pressuring gas project feasibility.

Taking On Water

Currently, 41 projects representing an estimated $158bn in CAPEX have not entered EPC and 97% of the reserves from these projects are gas. Given the current challenging outlook for gas project economics, these projects might not receive an FID as operators could delay sanctioning until conditions improve, possibly abandoning some projects altogether. The situation could be exacerbated by Australia’s general election, which (at the time of writing) looks likely to produce a hung parliament, muddying energy policy waters and possibly putting a domestic gas reservation policy on future projects on the political agenda. That being said, the drive for environmentally friendly fuels could boost gas demand and improve the viability of gas projects in the longer term.

Political issues aside though, oversupply and low gas prices are key. Due to these factors, the near term investment outlook is very uncertain. However, with a project backlog of $158bn, offshore Australia still retains massive long term potential.

OIMT201607

With seaborne transportation accounting for the vast majority of the world’s international trade, the importance of the shipping industry to the mechanics of the world economy is generally fairly evident. But putting it into context in actual annual value terms, how does the magnitude of the shipping business compare to the size of some of the world’s economies?

Big Traders

There are a number of ways to attempt to put the annual impact of the shipping industry into the context of the wider world economy. One is to examine the value of seaborne trades. Seaborne iron ore trade totalled 1.3bn tonnes in 2015. At an annual average ore price of around $50/t, that equates to a value of $68bn. That’s about the size of the GDP of Kenya. However, that’s dwarfed by seaborne crude oil trade. At 37.4m bpd last year, at an average oil price of around $52/bbl, that’s an annual value of $717bn, almost equivalent to the GDP of Turkey (the world’s 18th largest economy). On the container side, taking port handling as an interesting metric, last year there were an estimated 664m TEU lifts at the world’s box ports. Average handling charges vary significantly, but if they worked out at $150/TEU that’s an economy of just under $100bn, almost the size of the GDP of Angola.

Of course the value of global seaborne trade must be huge. The WTO estimates the value of all global trade at $16.5 trillion, and almost 85% by volume moves by sea. Seaborne trade is probably a little skewed to relatively cheaper goods but even allowing for, say, 50% of the total value, that’s still over $8 trillion, heading towards the size of China’s economy!

Adding The Value

Another way to put shipping’s magnitude into context is to take a look at the value of the assets. Between 2007 and 2015 the average annual level of investment in newbuildings was $127bn. That’s bigger than the GDP of Hungary. Alternatively, taking the value of the fleet today, $904bn, and allowing for, say, another 15 years of trading (the average age by tonnage is around 10 years), would equate to a per annum value of $60bn, still bigger than the economy of Panama.

Call In The Revenue

But perhaps the clearest way to mirror GDP is to check the annual earnings of the vessels, just as GDP measures economic production. In 2016’s challenging market conditions, the ClarkSea Index has averaged $9,733/day (which would total aggregate earnings of $77bn in a full year across the c.22,000 vessels in the main volume sectors), but back in 2007 it averaged over $33,060/day (across over 15,600 vessels). Across a year that’s earnings of $189bn. Almost as big as the economy of shipping’s favourite investor nation, Greece!

A Big Whole

Shipping is just one of a wide range of economic activities on the planet. Sometimes its impact can be hard to put into context. But in terms of ‘economic magnitude’, elements of the shipping industry can be as big as the whole of one of the world’s larger economies, especially in a good year. Have a nice day!

SIW1231 Graph of the Week

Down the years, shipbuilders have always entered and exited the business as cycles have progressed, but over the past decade developments have been dramatic. Back in 2007, 220 shipyards secured at least one order for a unit of 20,000 dwt or above in size, but in 2015 just 101 yards were successful in doing so. What have been the characteristics of such acute changes in the shipbuilding landscape?

Following The Plot

 ‘Fatal Attraction’ was an 1980s thriller movie in which a weekend affair resulted in a tricky predicament. Having had its fling with investors, it could be said that the shipbuilding industry has also found itself in severe distress. At the climax of the newbuilding investment boom in 2007, 220 yards took an order (for a vessel of 20,000 dwt or above), up 80% on the number in 2005. However, the global economic downturn ended the ‘affair’ and the number of yards to take an order fell 45% in 2009. Chinese state subsidies reignited old flames in 2010, when 190 yards attracted an order (62% were located in China) and countercyclical ordering helped support around 130 yards in 2013 and 2014, but the general trend has been a steady fall in the number of shipyards successful in attracting orders in the recent investment environment.

Character Development

In 2015, 1,083 orders (20,000 dwt and above) were placed at 101 yards globally, and of the yards who took an order in 2007, only 80 (36% of the total) were successful in doing so last year. Shipbuilders who ‘left the scene’ in this period included many Chinese yards (87), generally focussed on the bulker sector, as well as a number of European yards (17) finally ceding to Asian competition.

The solid line on the graph represents the number of yards taking 20 or more orders each year. This number has fluctuated less than the total number of yards taking orders, reflecting the more consistent part of the industry, including established Korean yards and ‘top tier’ Chinese state yards (27 different yards have appeared in this grouping since 2010). The dotted line shows yards who have received five or less orders each year, and reflects the more vulnerable end of the business, making up 51% of yards who took an order in 2007, but accounting for an average of 37% of the total between 2013 and 2015. 62% of yards in this grouping who took a contract in 2007 have not received an order since 2012.

No Alternate Ending?

On a more positive note, despite the fall in the number of yards to take a contract in 2015, six of the 18 yards to take 20 or more orders took their largest number of contracts since 2007 last year. For the first time this decade the largest number of these yards were in Japan (7).

Nevertheless, the environment clearly remains severely challenging. In 1H 2016, 97 orders were reported placed (for units 20,000 dwt or above) across just 27 yards. Though there may be some late reporting, and optimism from some quarters that 2H 2016 could see increased contract volumes, changes to the industry landscape appear to have been stark (and for some ‘fatal’). Over the second half of this year, market observers should continue to watch the drama closely

SIW1230

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